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Abstract
We study a model of two-player, zero-sum, stopping games with asymmetric informa-
tion. We assume that the payoff depends on two continuous-time Markov chains (Xt), (Yt),
where (Xt) is only observed by player 1 and (Yt) only by player 2, implying that the players
have access to stopping times with respect to different filtrations. We show the existence
of a value in mixed stopping times and provide a variational characterization for the value
as a function of the initial distribution of the Markov chains. We also prove a verifica-
tion theorem for optimal stopping rules which allows to construct optimal stopping times.
Finally we use our results to solve explicitly two generic examples.
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1 Introduction
In this paper we consider a two player zero-sum stopping game with asymmetric information.
The payoff depends on two independent continuous time Markov chains (Xt, Yt)t≥0 with finite
state space K × L, commonly known initial law p ⊗ q and infinitesimal generators R =
(Rk,k′)k,k′∈K and Q = (Q`,`′)`,`′∈L. We assume that X is only observed by player 1 while
Y is only observed by player 2. The fact that the game was not stopped up to some time
gives to each player some additional information about the unknown state. This is a crucial
point as it implies that players have to take into account which information they generate
about their private state when searching for optimal strategies. In consequence, our analysis
is significantly different to that of classical stopping games.
We prove the existence of the value V (p, q) in mixed stopping times allowing the players to
randomize their stopping decision. Mixed stopping times have already been studied by Baxter
and Chacon [3] and Meyer [35] in a continuous time setting and applied to stopping games by
Vieille and Touzi [45] and Laraki and Solan [32]. We also refer to the recent work of Shmaya
and Solan [43] for a concise study of this type of stopping times. We work under the common
assumptions on the payoffs used by Lepeltier and Maingueneau [33], in order to provide a
variational characterization for V . Moreover, we show how this variational characterization
can be applied to determine optimal strategies in the case of incomplete information on both
sides. This result is new, since up to now similar characterizations are only known for the
case of incomplete information on one side, and applies to a wide class of examples.
The variational characterization for V that we provide can be seen as an extension (in
a simple case) of the classical semi-harmonic characterization for stopping games of Markov
processes with symmetric information (see e.g. Friedman [20], Eckstro¨m and Peskir [17]) to
models with asymmetric information. It is reminiscent of the variational representation for
the value of repeated games with asymmetric information given by Mertens and Zamir [34]
(see also Rosenberg and Sorin [40] and Laraki [31]), who solved explicitly several examples
having a similar flavor than the examples we analyze. Our characterization is also equivalent
to a first-order PDE with convexity constraints as introduced by Cardaliaguet in [4, 5]. Using
appropriate PDEs with convexity constraints, the ideas of [4, 5] have been used to analyze
particular classes of continuous-time games by Cardaliaguet and Rainer [6, 8], continuous
time stopping games by Gru¨n [26] and continuous time limit of repeated games by Gensbittel
[21, 22].
Most of the literature on dynamic games with asymmetric information deals with models
where the payoff-relevant parameters of the game that are partially unknown (say information
parameters) do not evolve over time. Some recent works focus on models of dynamic games
with asymmetric information and evolving information parameters (see e.g. Renault [38],
Neyman [36], Gensbittel and Renault [25], Cardaliaguet et al. [9], Gensbittel [23]). All these
works consider dynamic games with current or terminal payoffs while in the present work we
study the case of continuous-time stopping games with time-evolving information parameters.
The paper is structured as follows. First we give a description of the model and the
main definitions. In the third section we establish existence and uniqueness of the value by a
variational characterization using PDE methods. We use this result in the following section to
characterize optimal strategies for both players. In section 5 we present two examples where
explicit expressions for the value as well as optimal strategies for both players are provided.
The appendix collects auxiliary results and some technical proofs.
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2 Model
2.1 Notation
For any topological space E, B(E) denotes its Borel σ-algebra, ∆(E) denotes the set of Borel
probability distributions on E and δx denotes the Dirac measure at x ∈ E. Finite sets are
endowed with the discrete topology and Cartesian products with the product topology. If E
is finite, then |E| denotes its cardinal and ∆(E) is identified with the unit simplex of RE .
〈., .〉 and |.| applied to vectors stand the usual scalar product and Euclidean norm while >M
stands for the transpose of a matrix M .
2.2 The dynamics
Let K,L be two non-empty finite sets. We consider two independent continuous-time, homo-
geneous Markov chains (Xt)t≥0 and (Yt)t≥0 with state space K and L, initial laws p ∈ ∆(K),
q ∈ ∆(L) and infinitesimal generators R = (Rk,k′)k,k′∈K and Q = (Q`,`′)`,`′∈L respectively.
Rk,k′ represents as usual the jump intensity of the process X from state k to state k
′ when
k′ 6= k and Rk,k = −
∑
k′ 6=k Rk,k′ .
We denote PXp the law of the process X defined on the canonical space of K-valued
ca`dla`g trajectories ΩX = D([0,∞),K) and PYq the law of the process Y defined on the space
ΩY = D([0,∞), L). Furthermore, let us define
(Ω,A;Pp,q) := (ΩX × ΩY ,FX∞ ⊗FY∞,PXp ⊗ PYq ).
We will identify the right-continuous filtrations FX and FY (see Theorem 26 p. 304 in [2]) as
filtrations defined on Ω as well as FX∞-measurable random variables on Ω as FX∞-measurable
variables defined on ΩX (and similarly for Y ).
We consider a zero-sum stopping game, where player 1 observes the trajectory of X, while
player 2 observes the trajectory of Y . So according to their information the dynamics of the
game for player 1 are basically given by(
Pp,q[Xt = k|FXs ]
)
k∈K = e
(t−s)>RδXs ,
(
Pp,q[Yt = `|FX∞]
)
`∈L = e
t>Qq,
while for player 2 they are given by(
Pp,q[Xt = k|FY∞]
)
k∈K = e
t>Rp,
(
Pp,q[Yt = `|FYs ]
)
`∈L = e
(t−s)>QδYs ,
where we use the independence of X and Y .
2.3 Mixed stopping times and payoff function
Let T X denote the set of FX stopping times and T Y denote the set of FY stopping times.
Definition 2.1. A mixed stopping time of the filtration FX on Ω is an FX∞ ⊗ B([0, 1])-
measurable map µ defined on Ω × [0, 1] such that µ(., u) ∈ T X for all u ∈ [0, 1]. We denote
T Xm the set of mixed FX-stopping times.
The definition mixed stopping times of the filtration FY is similar. We denote T Ym the set
of mixed FY -stopping times.
A random time is a B([0, 1])-measurable map µ : [0, 1] → [0,+∞]. The set of random
times is denoted T ∅m.
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Let r > 0 denote a fix discount rate and f ≥ h two real-valued functions defined on K×L.
The players choose mixed stopping times µ(ω, u) ∈ T Xm and ν(ω, v) ∈ T Ym respectively, in
order to maximize (resp. minimize) the expected payoff:
Ep,q
[∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
J(µ, ν)(ω, u, v)dudv
]
, (2.1)
where
J(µ, ν)(ω, u, v) := e−rνf(Xν , Yν)1ν<µ + e−rµh(Xµ, Yµ)1µ≤ν , (2.2)
with the convention that J(µ, ν)(ω, u, v) = 0 on {µ = ν = +∞}. Furthermore we set
J¯(µ, ν) :=
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
J(µ, ν)(ω, u, v)dudv.
The upper value of the game is defined by
V +(p, q) := inf
ν∈T Ym
sup
µ∈T Xm
Ep,q
[
J¯(µ, ν)
]
, (2.3)
the lower value by
V −(p, q) := sup
µ∈T Xm
inf
ν∈T Ym
Ep,q
[
J¯(µ, ν)
]
, (2.4)
where by definition V −(p, q) ≤ V +(p, q). When there is equality, we say that the game has a
value V := V − = V +.
In the above expressions, the payoff is an expectation with respect to (ω, u, v), and we
distinguish ω, which is the trajectory of the process (X,Y ) and represents the exogenous
randomness of the model, from u and v, which are strategic randomizations introduced by
the players.
Despite the apparent asymmetry in the payoff function (2.2), our model is symmetric in
the following sense: If we define the modified payoff
J ′(µ, ν)(ω, u, v) := e−rνf(Xν , Yν)1ν≤µ + e−rµh(Xµ, Yµ)1µ<ν ,
then J ′ ≥ J , limn J(µ+ 1n , ν) = J ′(µ, ν) and limn J ′(µ, ν + 1n) = J(µ, ν), so that by bounded
convergence, the upper and lower values of the games with respective payoffs J and J ′ coincide
(see Lemma 5 in [33] for more details). Therefore, we shall state and prove most of our results
only on one side (properties of the upper value in section 3, construction of an optimal stopping
time for player 1 in section 4), as the corresponding result on the other side (properties of the
lower value, optimal stopping time for player 2) can be obtained by exchanging the roles of
the players.
Let us comment the notion of mixed (or randomized) stopping times. Our definition
corresponds to the classical notion of mixed strategy in a game: for each player, a mixed
strategy is a probability distribution over his possible pure (i.e. standard) strategies. Following
Aumann [1], a natural way to define mixed strategies when the set of pure strategies is a set of
measurable maps but has no simple measurable structure (as T X and T Y in our model), is to
introduce an auxiliary probability space which is used as a randomization device by the player,
allowing him to choose at random a pure strategy. With such a definition, one has only to
require the mixed strategy to be jointly measurable for the expected payoff to be well-defined.
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We refer the reader to [43] for a discussion of the different equivalent definitions of randomized
stopping times. From an analytic point of view, the set of randomized stopping times T Xm is
the closed convex hull for the weak topology (which may coincide with the closure in some
cases but not in our model1) of the set of stopping times τ ∈ T X seen as linear forms E[Zτ ]
acting on the class of bounded FX∞-measurable continuous processes Z, and it was proved to
be compact in [3] and [35]. We do not use such topological properties of mixed stopping times
and our existence result is not based on some general minmax theorem, but convexity plays
a central role in our analysis, as can be seen in the statement of Theorem 3.3.
It is well known that in games where both players have the same information the value
exists under fairly general assumptions, when the players are only allowed to choose stopping
times adapted to their common information. The existence of the value implies that there is
no loss for either of the players if they give their adversary the advantage of playing second.
For example in V +(p, q) the maximizer has an information advantage by knowing exactly
which strategies he is facing. In games with incomplete information, existence of a value in
non-randomized strategies is in general not true, as shown in the first example in section 5.
The intuitive explanation is that the first player would, by choosing non randomized strategies,
reveal too much information to the second player about the process X, which is not observed
by player 2. In contrast, using randomized strategies allow each player to manipulate the
beliefs of his opponent. This translates into the fact that the value is concave in p and convex
in q (see Lemma 3.5) and, as can be seen in the examples of section 5, in general non-linear
with respect to the initial distributions (p, q) ∈ ∆(K)×∆(L).
3 Existence and characterization of the value
3.1 Result
Our first result is the existence of the value together with a variational characterization,
which is a first-order PDE with convexity constraints. These constraints are expressed using
the notion of extreme points as in [8, 31, 40], but could be equivalently written in terms of dual
viscosity solution as in [4] or as a viscosity solution of an equation with a double obstacle as
in [5]. The main advantage of our formulation is that the corresponding comparison principle
(Theorem 3.12) is a short an easy adaptation of the one given by Mertens and Zamir in [34].
Definition 3.1. A function g : ∆(K) × ∆(L) → R is said to be a saddle function if it is
concave with respect to p ∈ ∆(K) and convex with respect to q ∈ ∆(L).
For any q ∈ ∆(L), the set of extreme points Ext(g(., q)) is defined as the set of all p ∈ ∆(K)
such that
(p, g(p, q)) = λ(p1, g(p1, q)) + (1− λ)(p2, g(p2, q))
with λ ∈ (0, 1) and p1, p2 ∈ ∆(K) implies p1 = p2 = p. The set of extreme points Ext(g(p, .))
for any p ∈ ∆(K) is defined in a similar way.
Remark 3.2. One can check easily that Ext(g(., q)) is the set of p ∈ ∆(K) such that
(p, g(p, q)) is an extreme point (in the usual sense, see Definition 3.11) of the hypograph
1Indeed, if X0 = 0, for sufficiently small α > 0, it is not possible to obtain the linear form
1
2
(Eδ0 [Z0 +Zα]) as
a limit of classical stopping times. This is due to the fact that the event {∀s ∈ [0, α], Xs = 0} has probability
close to 1 for small α, implying that no stopping time in T X can be equal to 0 and α with probabilities close
to 1/2.
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of g(., q) defined by {(p′, t) ∈ ∆(K)×R | t ≤ g(p′, q)}. That p ∈ Ext(g(., q)) means that g(., q)
is strictly concave at p, i.e. not affine in any non-trivial segment containing p. Note also that
this definition implies that all the Dirac masses δk for k ∈ K always belong to Ext(g(., q)).
Similarly properties hold for Ext(g(p, .)).
Let f, h be extended linearly on the set ∆(K), i.e.
∀(p, q) ∈ ∆(K)×∆(L), f(p, q) :=
∑
(k,`)∈K×L
pkq`f(k, `), h(p, q) :=
∑
(k,`)∈K×L
pkq`h(k, `).
Theorem 3.3. For all (p, q) ∈ ∆(K)×∆(L), the game has a value
V (p, q) := V +(p, q) = V −(p, q),
and V is the unique Lipschitz saddle function on ∆(K)×∆(L) such that:
(Subsolution) ∀q ∈ ∆(L), ∀p ∈ Ext(V (., q)),
max{min{rV (p, q)− ~D1V (p, q; >Rp)− ~D2V (p, q; >Qq);V (p, q)− h(p, q)};
V (p, q)− f(p, q)} ≤ 0, (3.1)
(Supersolution) ∀p ∈ ∆(K), ∀q ∈ Ext(V (p, .)),
max{min{rV (p, q)− ~D1V (p, q; >Rp)− ~D2V (p, q; >Qq);V (p, q)− h(p, q)};
V (p, q)− f(p, q)} ≥ 0, (3.2)
where ~D1V (p, q; ξ) and ~D2V (p, q; ζ) denote the directional derivatives of V at (p, q) with re-
spect to the first and second variables in the directions ξ and ζ respectively.
Let us comment (3.1) and (3.2). If p is an extreme point, i.e. p ∈ Ext(V (., q)), (3.1) is a
standard subsolution property for the obstacle PDE,
max{min{rV (p, q)− ~D1V (p, q;>Rp)− ~D2V (p, q;>Qq);V (p, q)− h(p, q)};
V (p, q)− f(p, q)} = 0, (3.3)
while if q is an extreme point, i.e. q ∈ Ext(V (p, ·)), (3.2) is the supersolution property for
this PDE. We note that because V is a saddle function, it is reasonable to state the equation
in the strong form since we can define directional derivatives. This allows us also to derive
the comparison principle in section 3.6 with classical tools.
Moreover the game where neither player observes (Xt, Yt) corresponds to a game with
deterministic dynamic on ∆(K) × ∆(L) given by the marginal distribution of (Xt, Yt), i.e.
(et
>Rp, et
>Qq) for some initial values (p, q) ∈ ∆(K) × ∆(L). It is well known that its value
denoted S(p, q) is characterized as the unique viscosity solution to
max{min{rS(p, q)− 〈∇pS(p, q),>Rp〉 − 〈∇qS(p, q),>Qp〉;S(p, q)− h(p, q)};
S(p, q)− f(p, q)} = 0, (3.4)
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which is (3.3) with a weaker a priori regularity. So loosely speaking, for extreme points of the
value function of the game with incomplete information, V (p, q) solves the same variational
inequalities as S(p, q). However, the set of extreme points might be very small (but it contains
at least all the Dirac masses) and our characterization also requires V to be a saddle function.
It follows that the value function V (p, q) significantly differs from the solution to (3.4) in
general, as seen in the second example in section 5 where the set of extreme points of V
contains only one point which is not a Dirac mass (see Remark 5.4).
The rest of this section is devoted the the proof of Theorem 3.3. We adapt the techniques
in Cardaliaguet [4] to the context of stopping games. The main structure of our proof is
similar and goes as follows:
• We first establish in Lemma 3.5 that V + is a Lipschitz saddle function (the convexity
properties of values of games with incomplete information hold in very general models,
see e.g. chapter 2 in [44])
• We prove in Lemma 3.6 that the concave conjugate V +,∗ of V + with respect to the first
variable admits an alternative formulation, which is actually the lower value of the dual
game introduced by De Meyer [14]. Using this result, we prove in Proposition 3.7 that
V +,∗ satisfies a super-dynamic programming principle.
• As usual in the theory of differential games (see e.g. the seminal paper of Evans and
Souganidis [18]), we deduce from the super-dynamic programming principle, that V +,∗
satisfies a variational inequality (Proposition 3.9). Using duality, we prove in Proposition
3.10 that this variational inequality implies that V + satisfies the subsolution property
(3.1).
• By symmetry of the model, V − satisfies the supersolution property (3.2).
• We conclude that the two preceding properties imply V − = V + by proving a comparison
principle (Theorem 3.12).
3.2 Properties of V + and its concave conjugate
First we note the following facts.
Remark 3.4. V + can be estimated from above by setting ν = 0 and taking into consideration
that the obstacles satisfy h ≤ f , we deduce that V +(p, q) ≤ f(p, q). Similarly, we have
h(p, q) ≤ V +(p, q). On the other hand, we can replace the supremum over T Xm by a supremum
over T X in the definition of V +, i.e.
V +(p, q) = infν∈T Ym supµ∈T X Ep,q[J¯(µ, ν)]. (3.5)
Indeed, using Fubini’s theorem, for any ν ∈ T Ym , we have
sup
µ∈T Xm
Ep,q[J¯(µ, ν)] = sup
µ∈T Xm
∫ 1
0
Ep,q[
∫ 1
0
J(µ, ν)dv]du ≤ sup
µ∈T Xm
sup
u∈[0,1]
Ep,q[
∫ 1
0
J(µ(., u), ν)dv],
and since for all µ ∈ T Xm and all u ∈ [0, 1], µ(., u) is a stopping time in T X , we deduce that
sup
µ∈T Xm
J¯(µ, ν) ≤ sup
µ∈T X
J¯(µ, ν),
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which proves the result since T X ⊂ T Xm .
We summarize the properties of V + in the following lemma.
Lemma 3.5. V + is a Lipschitz saddle function.
Proof. Note that for any µ ∈ T Xm , ν ∈ T Ym , it holds by conditioning
Ep,q
[
J¯(µ, ν)
]
=
∑
k∈K,`∈L P[X0 = k] P[Y0 = `] Ep,q
[
J¯(µ, ν)|X0 = k, Y0 = `
]
=
∑
k∈K,`∈L pk q`Eδk,δ`
[
J¯(µ, ν)
]
,
(3.6)
δk, δ` denoting the Dirac masses at k, ` identified with the k-th, `-th vectors in the canonical
bases of RK and RL respectively.
In order to show the Lipschitz continuity, let p, p′ ∈ ∆(K), q, q′ ∈ ∆(L) such that 0 <
V +(p, q)− V +(p′, q′). Choosing ν∗ ∈ T Ym ε-optimal for V +(p′, q′) and µ∗ ∈ T Ym ε-optimal for
supµ∈T Xm Ep,q
[
J¯(µ, ν∗)
]
we have
0 < V +(p, q)− V +(p′, q′) ≤ Ep,q
[
J¯(µ∗, ν∗)
]− Ep′,q′ [J¯(µ∗, ν∗)]+ 2ε (3.7)
for ε arbitrarily small. The Lipschitz continuity follows then immediately by (3.6).
Furthermore we claim that:
V +(p, q) = infν∈T Ym supµ∈T X Ep,q
[
J¯(µ, ν)
]
= infν∈T Ym
∑
k∈K pk
(
supµ∈T X Eδk,q
[
J¯(µ, ν)
])
.
(3.8)
Indeed, V +(p, q) is clearly less or equal than the second line in the above equation. To prove
the reverse inequality, for any ν ∈ T Ym , and any k ∈ K, let µk be some ε-optimal stopping
time for the problem supµ∈T X Eδk,q
[
J¯(µ, ν)
]
. Setting µ =
∑
k∈K 1X0=kµ
k we note that∑
k∈K
pk Eδk,q
[
J¯(µk, ν)
]
= Ep,q
[
J¯(µ, ν)
]
and (3.8) follows by sending ε to zero.
We deduce from (3.8) that p → V +(p, q) is concave as an infimum of affine functions. The
convexity in q follows by the classical splitting method. Let q1, q2, q ∈ ∆(L), λ ∈ (0, 1) such
that
q = λq1 + (1− λ)q2.
We choose ν1 ∈ T Ym , ν2 ∈ T Ym ε-optimal for V +(p, q1) and V +(p, q2) respectively. Then we
will construct ν ∈ T Ym such that
Ep,q
[
J¯(µ, ν)
]
= λEp,q1
[
J¯(µ, ν1)
]
+ (1− λ)Ep,q2
[
J¯(µ, ν2)
]
. (3.9)
The intuition of the construction is the following: At time t = 0, player 2, knowing Y0, can
choose at random a decision d ∈ {1, 2} such that the conditional law of Y0 given that d = 1 is
q1 and the conditional law of Y0 given d = 2 is q2. He will then play ν1 if d = 1 and ν2 when
d = 2. More precisely, we set
ν(ω, u) =
L∑
`=1
1Y0=`
(
1
u∈[0,λ(q1)`
q`
]
ν1(ω,
q`
λ(q1)`
u) + 1
u∈(λ(q1)`
q`
,1]
ν2(ω,
q`u− λ(q1)`
(1− λ)(q2)` )
)
(3.10)
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By the definition of µ the probability to choose ν1 given that Y0 = ` is
λ(q1)`
q`
whenever q` > 0
and the probability to choose ν2 is
(1−λ)(q2)`
q`
. It follows that
Ep,q
[
J¯(µ, ν)
]
= Ep,q
[∫ 1
0
J(µ, ν(., u))du
]
= Ep,q
[∑
`∈L
1Y0=`
(∫ λ(q1)`
q`
0
J(µ, ν1(.,
q`
λ(q1)`
u))
+
∫ 1
λ(q1)`
q`
J(µ, ν2(.,
q`u− λ(q1)`
(1− λ)(q2)` ))
)
du
]
= Ep,q
[∑
`∈L
1Y0=`
(
λ(q1)`
q`
J¯(µ, ν1) +
(1− λ)(q2)`
q`
J¯(µ, ν2)
)]
= λEp,q1
[
J¯(µ, ν1)
]
+ (1− λ)Ep,q2
[
J¯(µ, ν2)
]
.
Maximizing (3.9) over µ ∈ T Xm yields then, using the ε optimality of ν1 and ν2,
V +(p, q) ≤ λV +(p, q1) + (1− λ)V +(p, q2) + ε
and the convexity in q follows since ε can be chosen arbitrarily small.
Next we define the concave conjugate in p of V + as
∀x ∈ RK , q ∈ ∆(L), V +,∗(x, q) := inf
p∈∆(K)
{〈x, p〉 − V +(p, q)}
As h ≤ V + ≤ f , it follows that:
f∗(x, q) ≤ V ∗,+(x, q) ≤ h∗(x, q), (3.11)
where the functions h∗, f∗ are defined as
h∗(x, q) := infp∈∆(K){〈x, p〉 − h(p, q)}, f∗(x, q) := infp∈∆(K){〈x, p〉 − f(p, q)}. (3.12)
The next lemma provides an alternative formulation, which is actually the opposite of the
upper value of a modified version of the game, called the dual game (see [14]), where player
1 chooses privately the initial state X0 = k at the beginning of the game, and has to pay a
cost xk.
Lemma 3.6. We have the following, alternative representation:
∀x ∈ RK , q ∈ ∆(L), V +,∗(x, q) = sup
ν∈T Ym
inf
µ∈T X
inf
p∈∆(K)
(〈x, p〉 − Ep,q[J¯(µ, ν)]) (3.13)
Proof. Using remark 3.4, we have
V +,∗(x, q) = inf
p∈∆(K)
sup
ν∈T Ym
inf
µ∈T X
(〈x, p〉 − Ep,q[J¯(µ, ν)]).
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Then, we will apply Fan’s minmax theorem (see [19]) to deduce that:
V +,∗(x, q) = inf
p∈∆(K)
sup
ν∈T Ym
inf
µ∈T X
(〈x, p〉 − Ep,q[J¯(µ, ν)])
= sup
ν∈T Ym
inf
p∈∆(K)
inf
µ∈T X
(〈x, p〉 − Ep,q[J¯(µ, ν)]).
In order to apply Fan’s minmax theorem, we have to check that the function
(p, ν) ∈ ∆(K)× T Ym → inf
µ∈T X
(〈x, p〉 − Ep,q[J¯(µ, ν)])
is concave-like with respect to ν ∈ T Ym and affine (hence continuous) with respect to p in the
compact convex set ∆(K).
To prove the concave-like property, given ν1, ν2 ∈ T Ym , and λ ∈ (0, 1), we define the mixed
stopping time ν by
ν(ω, u) = ν1(ω,
u
λ
)1u∈[0,λ) + ν2(ω,
u− λ
1− λ )1u∈[λ,1].
A simple change of variables gives:
inf
µ∈T X
(〈x, p〉−Ep,q[J¯(µ, ν)])
≥ λ inf
µ∈T X
(〈x, p〉 − Ep,q[J¯(µ, ν1)])+ (1− λ) inf
µ∈T X
(〈x, p〉 − Ep,q[J¯(µ, ν2)]),
which is exactly the the concave-like property we need to apply Fan’s theorem.
The second property follows from the relation:
inf
µ∈T X
(〈x, p〉 − Ep,q[J¯(µ, ν)]) = 〈x, p〉 −∑
k∈K
pk sup
µ∈T X
Eδk,q[J¯(µ, ν)].
This last equation is proved in the same way as equation (3.8) in Lemma 3.5.
3.3 Dynamic Programming for V +,∗
We will now prove a dynamic programming inequality for V +,∗. This result is very intuitive,
it reflects the fact that it is sub-optimal for player 2 in the dual game to wait and start the
game only at time ε without using the information conveyed by the process Y on the time
interval [0, ε).
Proposition 3.7. For all ε > 0
V +,∗(x, q) ≥ inf
t∈[0,ε]
(
e−rth∗(xt, qt)1t<ε + e−rεV +,∗(xε, qε)1t=ε
)
, (3.14)
where the dynamic (xt, qt) is given by
∀t ≥ 0, xt = x+
∫ t
0
(rI −R)xsds and qt = q +
∫ t
0
>Qqsds.
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Proof. In order to prove the dynamic programming inequalities, we need to recall the definition
of the shift operator θX on ΩX . For all t ≥ 0, the map θXt : ΩX → ΩX is defined by
∀s ≥ 0, θXt (ωX)(s) = ωX(s+ t).
The shift operator θY on ΩY is defined similarly.
Given ε > 0, we consider the family T Ym,ε of mixed stopping times ν ∈ T Ym such that there
exists a mixed stopping time ν ′ ∈ T Ym and ν(ω, v) = ε+ ν ′(θYε (ωY ), v).
As T Ym,ε ⊂ T Ym , we have
V +,∗(x, q) ≥ sup
ν∈T Ym,ε
inf
µ∈T X
inf
p∈∆(K)
(
〈x, p〉 − Ep,q
[
e−rµh(Xµ, Yµ)1µ<ε
+ e−rε
∫ 1
0
(
e−r(ν−ε)f(Xν , Yν)1ν<µ + e−r(µ−ε)h(Xµ, Yµ)1µ≤ν
)
dv1µ≥ε
])
. (3.15)
Let us fix ν ∈ T Ym,ε (or equivalently ν ′ ∈ T Ym ), µ ∈ T X and p ∈ ∆(K). By conditioning, we
obtain:
Ep,q
[
e−rµh(Xµ, Yµ)1µ<ε + e−rε
∫ 1
0
(
e−r(ν−ε)f(Xν , Yν)1ν<µ + e−r(µ−ε)h(Xµ, Yµ)1µ≤ν
)
dv1µ≥ε
]
= Ep,q
[
e−rµEp,q
[
h(Xµ, Yµ)|FXµ
]
1µ<ε
+ e−rεEp,q
[ ∫ 1
0
(
e−r(ν−ε)f(Xν , Yν)1ν<µ + e−r(µ−ε)h(Xµ, Yµ)1µ≤ν
)
dv|FX,Yε
]
1µ≥ε
]
Recall that the stopping time µ of the filtration FX can be identified with a stopping time
defined on ΩX . It is well-known that on the event µ ≥ ε, we have µ = µ′(ωX , θXε (ωX)) + ε,
where µ′ is FXε ⊗FX∞ measurable and for all ω, µ′(ω, .) is an FX stopping time (see theorem
103 p. 151 in [13]). Then, using the Markov property, we deduce that
1µ≥εEp,q[
∫ 1
0
(
e−r(ν−ε)f(Xν , Yν)1ν<µ + e−r(µ−ε)h(Xµ, Yµ)1µ≤ν
)
dv|FX,Yε ]
= 1µ≥εEδXε ,δYε [J¯(µ
′(ω, .), ν ′)].
On the other hand, since X and Y are independent we have
Ep,q[δXt,Yt |FXt ] = δXt ⊗ qt ∈ ∆(K × L). (3.16)
Using the usual properties of the optional projection (see e.g. [13]) the previous equality
implies Ep,q[h(Xµ, Yµ)|FXµ ] = h(δXµ , qµ), and inequality (3.15) may be rewritten as
V +,∗(x, q) ≥ sup
ν′∈T Ym
inf
µ∈T X
inf
p∈∆(K)(
〈x, p〉 − Ep,q[e−rµh(δXµ , qµ)1µ<ε + e−rεEXε,Yε [J¯(µ′(ω, .), ν ′)]1µ≥ε]
)
.
Defining
∀(ν ′, p, q) ∈ T Ym ×∆(K)×∆(L), F (ν ′, p, q) = sup
µˆ∈T X
Ep,q[J¯(µˆ, ν ′)]
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we have, using the same arguments as for (3.6) :
F (ν ′, p, q) =
∑
`∈L
∑
k∈K
q`pkF (ν ′, δk, δ`).
The previous inequality implies therefore
V +,∗(x, q) ≥ sup
ν′∈T Ym
inf
µ∈T X
inf
p∈∆(K)(
〈x, p〉 − Ep,q[e−rµh(δXµ , qµ)1µ<ε + e−rεF (ν ′, δXε , δYε)1µ≥ε]
)
(3.17)
and taking conditional expectation with respect to FXε , we obtain
Ep,q[F (ν ′, δXε , δYε)1µ≥ε|FXε ] = F (ν ′, δXε , qε)1µ≥ε.
Next, we apply the optional sampling theorem with the FX -stopping time µ ∧ ε and obtain
〈x, p〉 = Ep,q[〈x, e−µ>RδXµ〉1µ<ε + 〈x, e−ε
>RδXε〉1µ≥ε]
= Ep,q[〈e−µRx, δXµ〉1µ<ε + 〈e−εRx, δXε〉1µ≥ε].
Substituting the last two equalities in the right-hand side of (3.17) yields
〈x, p〉 − Ep,q[e−rµh(δXµ , qµ)1µ<ε + e−rεF (ν ′, δXε , qε)1µ≥ε]
= Ep,q[e−rµ(〈eµ(rI−R)x, δXµ〉 − h(δXµ , qµ))1µ<ε + e−rε(〈eε(rI−R)x, δXε〉 − F (ν ′, δXε , qε))1µ≥ε]
= Ep,q[e−rµ(〈xµ, δXµ〉 − h(δXµ , qµ))1µ<ε + e−rε(〈xε, δXε〉 − F (ν ′, δXε , qε))1µ≥ε].
Given any η > 0, let us choose ν ′ as an η-optimal minimizer in the problem V +,∗(xε, qε) (note
that these dynamics do not depend on p or µ), so that(〈xε, δXε〉 − F (ν ′, δXε , qε)) ≥ inf
p′∈∆(K)
(〈xε, p′〉 − F (ν ′, p′, qε))
= inf
p′∈∆(K)
inf
µˆ∈T X
(〈xε, p′〉 − Ep′,qε [J¯(µˆ, ν ′)])
≥ V +,∗(xε, qε)− η.
Using the preceding results in (3.17), we deduce that for all η > 0
V +,∗(x, q)
≥ inf
µ∈T X
inf
p∈∆(K)
Ep,q[e−rµ(〈xµ, δXµ〉 − h(δXµ , qµ))1µ<ε + e−rε(V +,∗(xε, qε)− η)1µ≥ε]
≥ inf
µ∈T X
inf
p∈∆(K)
Ep,q[e−rµh∗(xµ, qµ)1µ<ε + e−rε(V +,∗(xε, qε)− η)1µ≥ε].
Note that in the preceding expression, only µ is random, and thus we may replace the expec-
tation with an integral with respect to the law of µ on R+ denoted Pp,µ which yields
V +,∗(x, q) ≥ inf
µ∈T X
inf
p∈∆(K)
∫
R+
(
e−rth∗(xt, qt))1t<ε + e−rε(V +,∗(xε, qε)− η)1t≥ε
)
dPp,µ(t).
Using the linearity of the integral and arguing as in Remark 3.4, the infimum over all admis-
sible distributions for µ is equal to the infimum over Dirac masses (constant stopping times),
and the conclusion follows by sending η to zero.
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3.4 Subsolution property for V +
We will prove the subsolution property for V + by establishing a super-solution property for
V +,∗. The results rely on classical tools of convex analysis.
Notation 3.8. Let C ⊂ RK and D ⊂ RL denote two convex sets. For any g : C ×D → R
and (x, y) ∈ C ×D, we denote the sub-differential of g with respect to the first variable x by
∂−1 g(x, y) = {x∗ ∈ RK | ∀x′ ∈ C, g(x, y) + 〈x∗, x′ − x〉 ≤ g(x′, y)}.
The super-differential ∂+1 g(x, y) is defined similarly.
We use the index ∂−2 (resp. ∂
+
2 ), whenever we consider derivatives with respect to the second
variable y ∈ D. We use ∂+, ∂− for the full super- and sub-differential.
Proposition 3.9. For all (x, q) ∈ RK ×∆(L), we have
min{(h∗ − V +,∗)(x, q) ; ~DV +,∗(x, q; (rI −R)x, >Qq)− rV +∗(x, q)} ≤ 0. (3.18)
Proof. Recall that by Proposition 3.7, for all ε > 0
V +,∗(x, q) ≥ inf
t∈[0,ε]
(
e−rth∗(xt, qt)1t<ε + e−rεV +,∗(xε, qε)1t=ε
)
, (3.19)
where the dynamic (xt, qt) is given by xt = x +
∫ t
0 (rI − R)xsds and qt = q +
∫ t
0
>Qqsds. We
know that h∗(x, q) − V +,∗(x, q) ≥ 0 by construction. In case h∗(x, q) − V +,∗(x, q) > 0, there
exists by continuity an ε˜ > 0 such that for all 0 < ε ≤ ε˜, choosing t < ε would not be optimal
in (3.19). Thus
V +,∗(x, q) ≥ e−rεV +,∗(xε, qε). (3.20)
We deduce that (3.18) holds since:
~DV +,∗(x, q; (rI −R)x,>Qq)− rV +,∗(x, q) = lim
ε→0
1
ε
(
e−rεV +,∗(xε, qε)− V +,∗(x, q)
) ≤ 0.
The last equality follows from the fact that V +,∗ is Lipschitz, implying that:
V +,∗(xε, qε)− V +,∗(x+ ε(rI −R)x, q + ε>Qq) = o(ε).
Proposition 3.10. V + is a subsolution of (3.1).
Proof. Again it is sufficient to prove only the subsolution property for V +, as the proof of
the supersolution property for V − is similar due to the symmetry of the problem. Since by
construction V +(p¯, q¯) ≤ f(p¯, q¯) it remains to show that for q¯ ∈ ∆(L) and p¯ ∈ Ext(V (., q¯))
V +(p¯, q¯) > h(p¯, q¯)
implies
rV +(p¯, q¯)− ~D1V +(p¯, q¯;>Rp¯)− ~D2V +(p¯, q¯;>Qq¯) ≤ 0. (3.21)
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We first assume that p¯ is an exposed point of V (., q¯) (see Definition A.3) and V +(p¯, q¯) >
h(p¯, q¯). We will reformulate (3.21) using the conjugate function V +,∗. Let us choose x¯ ∈
∂+1 V
+(p¯, q¯) and y¯ ∈ ∂−2 V +(p¯, q¯) (see Lemma A.1), such that
~D1V
+(p¯, q¯;>Rp¯) = 〈x¯,>Rp¯〉, ~D2V +(p¯, q¯;>Qq¯) = 〈y¯,>Qq¯〉.
By construction V +(p¯, q¯) = 〈x¯, p¯〉 − V +,∗(x¯, q¯) and (3.21) can be written as
〈(rI −R)x¯, p¯〉 − 〈>Qq¯, y¯〉 − rV +,∗(x¯, q¯) ≤ 0. (3.22)
As p¯ is an exposed point, we know that there exists some xˆ ∈ ∂+1 V +(p¯, q¯) such that in the
expression
V +,∗(xˆ, q¯) = inf
p∈∆(K)
〈xˆ, p〉 − V +(p, q¯),
the minimum is uniquely attained in p¯. It follows that denoting u := xˆ− x¯, for all ε > 0, the
minimum in the expression
V +,∗(x¯+ εu, q¯) = inf
p∈∆(K)
〈x¯+ εu, p〉 − V +(p, q¯),
is uniquely attained in p¯. Note that it may be that x¯ = xˆ in which case u = 0. Fenchel’s
lemma implies that the function V +,∗(., q¯) is differentiable at x¯+ εu with a gradient equal to
p¯ and we have
V +,∗(x¯+ εu, q¯) = 〈x¯+ εu, p¯〉 − V +(p¯, q¯).
Instead of proving directly (3.22), we will prove that for all ε > 0
〈(rI −R)x¯+ εu, p¯〉 − 〈>Qq¯, y¯〉 − rV +,∗(x¯+ εu, q¯) ≤ 0, (3.23)
(3.22) follows then by sending ε > 0 to zero.
In order to apply Proposition 3.9, let us prove that V +,∗(x¯ + εu, q¯) < h∗(x¯ + εu, q¯). By
construction, we have V +,∗ ≤ h∗ since V + ≥ h. Assume by contradiction that V +,∗(x¯ +
εu, q¯) = h∗(x¯+ εu, q¯). Both functions being concave with respect to their first argument and
since D1V
+,∗(x¯+ εu, q¯) = p¯, we would have
D1h
∗(x¯+ εu, q¯) = D1V +,∗(x¯+ εu, q¯) = p¯,
and therefore
V +(p¯, q¯) = 〈x¯+ εu, p¯〉 − V +,∗(x¯+ εu, q¯) = 〈x¯+ εu, p¯〉 − h∗(x¯+ εu, q¯) = h(p¯, q¯),
which contradicts the assumption V +(p¯, q¯)− h(p¯, q¯) > 0.
Note that q → V +(p¯, q) is convex on ∆(L) and that y¯ was chosen so that the directional
derivative verifies (see Lemma A.1 for the first equality)
~D2V
+(p¯, q¯;>Qq¯) = max
v∈∂−2 V +(p¯,q¯)
〈v,>Qq¯〉 = 〈y¯,>Qq¯〉.
Since V +,∗ is a concave Lipschitz function on RK ×∆(L), the envelope theorem (see Lemma
A.2) implies
∂+V +,∗(x¯+ εu, q¯) = {p¯} × (−∂−2 V +(p¯, q¯)). (3.24)
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Indeed, note that the right-hand side of (3.24) is the superdifferential of the concave function
(x, q) ∈ RK ×∆(L)→ 〈x, p¯〉 − V +(p¯, q),
at (x¯+ εu, q¯). We deduce that the directional derivatives of V +,∗ at (x¯+ εu, q¯) verify
~DV +,∗(x¯+ εu, q¯; (rI −R)x¯,>Qq¯) = min
(w,v)∈∂+V +,∗(x¯+εu,q¯)
〈w, (rI −R)x¯〉+ 〈v,>Qq¯〉
= 〈p¯, (rI −R)x¯〉 − 〈y¯,>Qq¯〉.
(3.23) follows then from Proposition 3.9.
It remains to extend the result from exposed points to extreme points. We know that exposed
points are a dense subset of extreme points (see Theorem 18.6 in [41]). We may therefore use
an approximation argument by using Lemma A.4 applied to p → −V (., q¯) together with the
fact that p → ~D2V +(p, q¯) is upper semi-continuous (use Lemma A.1 together with the fact
that the correspondence of superdifferentials has closed graph).
3.5 Symmetric properties for V −
Let us briefly mention the properties satisfied by V − and its convex conjugate, as they will
be used in the next section. Define the convex conjugate in q of V − as
∀p ∈ ∆(K), y ∈ RL, V −∗ (p, y) := sup
q∈∆(L)
{〈q, y〉 − V −(p, q)}.
As in Remark 3.4, we have h(p, q) ≤ V −(p, q) ≤ f(p, q), and it follows that:
f∗(p, y) ≤ V −∗ (p, y) ≤ h∗(p, y), (3.25)
where the functions h∗, f∗ are defined as
h∗(p, y) := supq∈∆(L){〈q, y〉 − h(p, q)}, f∗(p, y) := supq∈∆(L){〈q, y〉 − f(p, q)}. (3.26)
As in Proposition 3.9, for all (p, y) ∈ ∆(K)× RL, we have
max{(f∗ − V −∗ )(x, q) ; ~DV −∗ (p, y;>Rp, (rI −Q)y)− rV −∗ (p, y)} ≥ 0. (3.27)
As in Proposition 3.10, (3.27) implies that V − is a supersolution of (3.2).
3.6 Comparison principle
In the previous section we showed that V +(p, q) is a subsolution to (3.1) while V −(p, q) verifies
the supersolution property (3.2). Since V +(p, q) ≥ V −(p, q) by construction the following
comparison principle will imply Theorem 3.3.
Let us recall the classical definition of an extreme point for a convex set.
Definition 3.11. Let C ⊂ Rn a convex set. x ∈ C is an extreme point of C if for any
x1, x2 ∈ C and λ ∈ [0, 1]:
λx1 + (1− λ)x2 = x⇒ x1 = x2 = x.
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Theorem 3.12. Let w1, w2 be two Lipschitz continuous saddle functions defined on ∆(K)×
∆(L) such that w1 verifies the subsolution property (3.1) and w2 verifies the supersolution
property (3.2). Then w1 ≤ w2.
Proof. We proceed by contradiction. Assume that M := max∆(K)×∆(L)w1 − w2 > 0 and
let C denote the compact set of (p, q) ∈ ∆(K) ×∆(L) where the maximum is reached. Let
(p¯, q¯) ∈ C denote an extreme point of the convex hull of C, which exists by Krein-Milman
theorem and belongs to C by definition of the convex hull. It follows that p¯ is an extreme
point of w1(·, q¯) and that q¯ is an extreme point of w1(p¯, .).
Let us prove this property for p¯ (the case of q¯ being symmetric). Assume that there exists
p1, p2 ∈ ∆(K) and λ ∈ (0, 1) such that p¯ = λp1 +(1−λ)p2 and λw1(p1, q¯)+(1−λ)w1(p2, q¯) =
w1(p¯, q¯). Using that w2(., q¯) is concave, we would have
λ(w1(p1, q¯)− w2(p1, q¯)) + (1− λ)(w1(p2, q¯)− w2(p2, q¯)) ≥ w1(p¯, q¯)− w2(p¯, q¯) = M.
As w1 − w2 ≤M , we deduce that (p1, q¯) and (p2, q¯) belong to C and therefore that p1 = p2.
At point (p¯, q¯), we have f(p¯, q¯) ≥ w1(p¯, q¯) > w2(p¯, q¯) ≥ h(p¯, q¯) so that
rw1(p¯, q¯)− ~D1w1(p¯, q¯;>Rp¯)− ~D2w1(p¯, q¯;>Qq¯) ≤ 0,
rw2(p¯, q¯)− ~D1w2(p¯, q¯;>Rp¯)− ~D2w2(p¯, q¯;>Qq¯) ≥ 0.
Note that >Rp (resp. >Qq) always belong to the tangent cone of ∆(K) at p (resp. of ∆(L) at
q) so that directional derivatives are well-defined and real-valued. We deduce that
~D1w1(p¯, q¯;
>Rp¯) + ~D2w1(p¯, q¯;>Qq¯) ≥ rw1(p¯, q¯) ≥ rw2(p¯, q¯) + rM
≥ ~D1w2(p¯, q¯;>Rp¯) + ~D2w2(p¯, q¯;>Qq¯) + rM.
It follows that one of the following inequalities holds true:
~D1w1(p¯, q¯;
>Rp¯) > ~D1w2(p¯, q¯;>Rp¯)
~D2w1(p¯, q¯;
>Qq¯) > ~D2w2(p¯, q¯;>Qq¯).
In the first case, this would imply that for a sufficiently small ε,
w1(p¯+ ε
>Rp¯, q¯)− w2(p¯+ ε>Rp¯, q¯) > w1(p¯, q¯)− w2(p¯, q¯) = M,
and thus a contradiction. The second case is similar and this concludes the proof.
4 Optimal stopping times
Using the PDE characterization of the value function V : ∆(K) × ∆(L) → R by Theorem
3.3, it is possible to give a verification theorem for mixed stopping times for both players.
Here we present the characterization of optimal stopping times µ for player 1, i.e. the player
observing X. By symmetry of the problem the result for player 2 is given in a similar way.
Our construction being quite technical, we provide below a heuristic description of our
result which emphasizes the relations with the existing literature on dynamic games with
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incomplete information. In order to characterize optimal stopping times µ for player 1, we
introduce the belief process of the uninformed player over X. Let us fix a mixed stopping
time µ ∈ T Xm . Despite the fact that player 2 has no information on X, he can compute for
any t ≥ 0 the conditional distribution pit (defined below) of Xt given the event that player 1
did not stop before time t. To that end we consider the product probability space
(Ω′,F ′,P′p,q) := (ΩX × ΩY × [0, 1],FX∞ ⊗FY∞ ⊗ B([0, 1]),Pp,q ⊗ Leb),
where Leb stands for the Lebesgue measure. The stopping time µ(ωX , u) is thus seen as a
random variable defined on Ω′.
We define the belief process pi taking values in ∆(K) as a ca`dla`g version of:
(P′p,q[Xt = k|Hµt ])k∈K , t ≥ 0, (4.1)
where Hµ is the usual right-continuous augmentation of σ(1µ≤s, 0 ≤ s ≤ t). By construction,
the process pi has the following property:
∀ 0 ≤ s ≤ t, EP′p,q [pit|Fpis ] = e(t−s)
>Rpis. (4.2)
Let us call a belief process optimal if there exists an optimal stopping time of player
1 inducing this belief process. It is classical in the literature on zero-sum dynamic games
with incomplete information to search for conditions ensuring that a belief process is optimal.
This idea appears explicitly in De Meyer [15], Cardaliaguet-Rainer [7], Gru¨n [26, 27] and
more recently in Cardaliaguet et al. [9]. Our main result has the same flavor as Theorem
4.11 in [7] where a set of sufficient conditions is given for a belief process to be optimal. Note
however that all these works were dealing with games with incomplete information on one
side. In order to adapt these techniques to our model with incomplete information on both
sides, we introduce a virtual dual process ξ taking values in RL, and consider the extended
belief process Z = (pi, ξ). This idea was already present in the work of Heuer [28], in which
(adapting the notation to that of our model) the strategy of player 1 was based on a virtual
belief process qt about the unknown state Yt of player 2 and on the corresponding dual variable
ξt ∈ ∂−2 V∗(pit, qt). We work here directly with the dual process ξ which is controlled by player
1. Precisely, the process ξ is ca`dla`g, Fpi-measurable and has to satisfy the property
∀ 0 ≤ s ≤ t, EP′p,q [ξt|Fpis ] = e(t−s)(rI−Q)ξs, (4.3)
which is related to the variational inequality (3.27) satisfied by V∗. The process Z is therefore
a pure jump process. We now consider the following two closed subsets of ∆(K)× RL
H := {(p, y) ∈ ∆(K)× RL | rV∗(p, y)− ~DV∗(p, y;>Rp, (rI −Q)y) ≥ 0},
S := {(p, y) ∈ ∆(K)× RL |V∗(p, y) = h∗(p, y)}.
The set H is related to the set called non-revealing set in [7]. Let us first describe informally
how player 1 can control the process Z, which basically reduces to three possible behaviors:
• Player 1 does not stop during a time interval [t, t + dt], and thanks to the conditions
(4.2), (4.3), the process Z follows the deterministic dynamic dZt = AZtdt where
A =
(>R 0
0 rI −Q
)
.
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• Player 1 stops with positive probability at some time t, which induces a jump of the
belief process pi, centered in pit−, and such that pit takes at most two different values
corresponding respectively to the events that player 1 did stop and did not stop at time
t. The process ξ may also have a jump at time t, centered in ξt− and having at most
two endpoints corresponding to the same events, however the endpoints of this jump
can be chosen arbitrarily.
• If player 1 stops with positive intensity ρ (which may depend on Xt) during some time
interval [t, t+ dt], then conditionally on the fact that player 1 did not stop, the process
pi follows a deterministic continuous trajectory, and jumps only when player 1 stops.
The behavior of ξ is similar, but the deterministic trajectory as well as the jump are not
determined by the stopping strategy of player 1 and can be chosen arbitrarily among
those satisfying (4.3).
Taking into account the stationarity of the model, we reduce the analysis to Markovian pro-
cesses Z having the above-mentioned properties, which are called piecewise deterministic
Markov process (PDMP) and have been introduced by Davis [10]. Precisely, we now focus on
stopping times µ which induce a belief process pi that can be extended on the time interval
[0, µ] to a PDMP Z = (pi, ξ) in the family formally described below. An informal statement
of our main theorem is the following: µ is an optimal stopping time in the game with initial
probabilities (p, q) if the induced belief process pi can be extended to a process Z = (pi, ξ)
which is a PDMP on the time interval [0, µ], with state space E ⊂ H ∪ S, random initial
condition Z0 and such that
• Z0− := E[Z0] = (p, y) with y ∈ ∂−2 V∗(p, q),
• Zt ∈ H on {t < µ} and Zµ ∈ S,
• jumps may occur only at times 0 and µ and over the flat parts of V∗,
• V∗ is regular enough.
The conditions that the belief process has to stay in the set H and can only jump over the
flat parts of the value function were already present in theorem 4.11 in [7]. Note however
that we consider here the conjugate value V∗ so that that both the set H and the definition of
flat parts depend on the additional variable ξ. Another important difference is the regularity
assumption: in [7], the value function was assumed to be C2 with respect to the state variable
in order to apply Itoˆ formula, whereas we only assume here a very weak differentiability
condition (see (4.5) below). Note that such a weak condition is necessary in order to apply
our theorem to the examples studied in section 5 where V∗ is not globally C1.
Let us now describe precisely the type of PDMP we will consider (see Davis [10] for more
details). Let E denote a closed subset of ∆(K)× RL and let (α, λ, φ) be given with:
• α : E → RK×RL: locally bounded measurable vector field such that for all initial point
z ∈ E, there exists a unique global solution of w′z(t) = α(wz(t)) with initial condition
wz(0) = z which stays in E.
• λ : E → R+: locally bounded measurable intensity function.
18
• φ : E → E: locally bounded measurable jump function such that for all z ∈ E, φ(z) 6= z
• We assume in addition that for all z ∈ E, the maps t→ α(wz(t)), λ(wz(t)), φ(wz(t)) are
ca`dla`g.
The construction of the PDMP Z with characteristics (α, λ, φ) and initial position Z0 =
z is as follows: Let T1 denote a non-negative random variable such that P(T1 > t) =
exp(− ∫ t0 λ(wz(s))ds). Then, define Zt = wz(t) for t ∈ [0, T1) and ZT1 = φ(wz(T1)). For
k ≥ 2, construct by induction the variables Tk − Tk−1, ZTk , and the process Z on [Tk−1, Tk]
using the same method where z is replaced by ZTk−1 .
The process Z has locally Lipschitz trajectories on the intervals [Tk−1, Tk) and jumps at times
Tk. We also assume that for all z ∈ E and all t ≥ 0, E[
∑
s≤t |Zs −Zs−|] <∞. This condition
ensures that the sequence Tk goes to +∞ so that the process Z is well-defined for all times.
We now introduce a set of assumptions, called structure conditions on E and (α, λ, φ) that
will be used in our verification theorem below.
Definition 4.1. We say that E and (α, λ, φ) fulfill the structure conditions (SC) if
(SC1) E = EH ∪ S with EH a nonempty closed subset of H, and EH ∩ S = ∅.
(SC2) For all z ∈ S, λ(z) = 0 and α(z) = 0. For all z ∈ EH, for all t ≥ 0, wz(t) ∈ EH.
(SC3) φ : EH → S and for all z ∈ EH, if we denote φ(z) = (φp(z), φy(z)), then
{k ∈ K|pk = 0} ⊂ {k ∈ K|φp(z)k = 0}.
(SC4) For all z ∈ EH:
λ(z)
(
V∗(φ(z))− V∗(z)− ~DV∗(z;φ(z)− z)
)
= 0. (4.4)
~DV∗(z;α(z)) + ~DV∗(z;λ(z)(φ(z)− z)) = ~DV∗ (z;α(z) + λ(z)(φ(z)− z)) . (4.5)
α(z) + λ(z)(φ(z)− z) = Az with A =
(>R 0
0 rI −Q
)
(4.6)
(SC5) For all z ∈ (∆(K)× RL) \ E, there exists z′ ∈ EH, z′′ ∈ S and m ∈ [0, 1] such that
z = (1−m)z′ +mz′′, V∗(z) = (1−m)V∗(z′) +mV∗(z′′).
Comments:
• Condition (SC2) means that all points in S are absorbing and that EH is invariant by
the flow associated to the ODE w′ = α(w).
• Condition (SC3) means that the direction of jump is deterministic and that any jump
should start in EH and end in S. (SC2) and (SC3) together ensure that the PDMP Z
with characteristics (α, λ, φ) is well-defined and integrable for any starting point in E.
• Condition (4.4) states that jumps occur only over the flat parts of the graph of V∗.
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• Since V∗ is convex, condition (4.5) means that for all z, V∗ is differentiable at z in the
direction of the cone generated by α(z) and the vector λ(z)(φ(z)− z). Note that this is
automatically true when λ(z) = 0 as V∗ admits directional derivatives.
• Condition (4.6) was designed in such a way that if Z is a PDMP with characteristics
(α, λ, φ) with Z0 = z ∈ H, then
∀t ≥ 0, E[Zt∧T1 ] = E[
∫ t∧T1
0
AZrdr]. (4.7)
Indeed, according to Theorem 5.5 in Davis [10], the identity map belongs to the extended
generator of the process Z so that Dynkin’s formula applies, implying that:
E[Zt∧T1 ] = E[
∫ t∧T1
0
(α(Zr) + λ(Zr)(φ(Zr)− Zr)) dr]
= E[
∫ t∧T1
0
AZrdr].
• Condition (SC5) means that for any point z outside of E, there exists a random initial
condition Z0 for the process, such that Z0 takes only two values, one in S and one in
EH, such that E[Z0] = z and E[V∗(Z0)] = V∗(z). With the convention Z0− := z, this
last equality means that the process jumps at time 0 over a flat part of V∗.
We are now ready to state our verification Theorem.
Theorem 4.2. Let (p, q) ∈ ∆(K) ×∆(L) and y ∈ ∂−2 V (p, q). If there exists characteristics
(α, λ, φ) fulfilling conditions (SC), then the stopping time µ ∈ T Xm defined below is optimal.
Case 1: If z = (p, y) ∈ EH, let us denote zt = (pt, yt) = wz(t).
Recall that (ω, u) denotes the canonical element in Ω′ and that u is independent of ω and uni-
formly distributed over [0, 1]. Let us consider a sequence of independent variables (Un(u))n≥0
uniformly distributed over [0, 1]. Given t ≥ 0 and k ∈ K, define as a measurable function of
u˜ ∈ [0, 1] the unique non-decreasing map M(t, k)(u˜) with values in [0,+∞] such that:∫ 1
0
1{M(t,k)(u˜)≥x}du˜ = exp(−
∫ t+x
t
φp(zs)k
(ps)k
λ(zs)ds),
with the convention 00 = 0. Let (Sn)n≥1 denote the sequence of jumps of the Markov chain X
and let S0 = 0. Define, with the convention inf ∅ = +∞:
µn(ω, u) = inf{t ∈ [Sn, Sn+1) | t− Sn ≥M(Sn, XSn)(Un(u))}.
Then µz(ω, u) = infn≥0 µn(ω, u) is optimal.
Case 2: If z /∈ E, let z′ = (p′, y′), z′′ = (p′′, y′′) and m ∈ (0, 1) be given by condition (SC5).
Then an optimal stopping time is given by:
µ(ω, u) = 0.1u≤m, X0∈supp(p′) + µz′(ω,
u−m
1−m )1u>m,
where µz′ is the stopping time constructed in case 1 and supp(p
′) denotes the support of p′.
Case 3: If z ∈ S, µ = 0 is optimal.
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The construction of the characteristics (α, λ, φ) is illustrated through two examples in
section 5 where a precise description of the optimal stopping time µ is given. The structure
of the proof is as follows. In part 1 we prove that the belief process pi associated with the
stopping time µ, can be extended to a process Z = (pi, ξ) which is a PDMP with characteristics
(α, λ, φ). This first part is purely technical, as the definition of µ was designed exactly for this
result to hold. Part 2 is more classical, we apply Dynkin’s formula to V∗(Z), and using the
structure conditions on Z, this leads to the inequality (4.13). Using then duality arguments
similar to the one used in section 3, we prove that (4.13) implies the optimality of µ.
Proof. Part 1: We construct a process Z which is an Hµ-PDMP with state space E ⊂
∆(K) × RL and characteristics (α, λ, φ). Some details are omitted as this first part relies
on classical probabilistic arguments. Throughout the proof, P stands for P′p,q, and E for the
associated expectation operator.
• We consider at first the case z ∈ EH.
Define the belief process pi by (4.1). Let us denote zt = (pt, yt) = wz(t). Define then the
process ξ by
∀t ≥ 0, ξt = yt1t<µ + φy(zµ)1t≥µ.
Note that ξ is an Hµ-adapted ca`dla`g random process taking values in RL.
We will prove that the process Z with Zt := (pit∧µ, ξt) is an Hµ-PDMP with state space
E ⊂ ∆(K)× RL, characteristics (α, λ, φ), having a unique jump at time µ.
Let T := sup{t |P(µ > t) > 0}. By definition of µ, we have T > 0 and for all k ∈ K and all
0 ≤ t < T such that (pt)k > 0:
1
h
(
P(µ ∈ (t, t+ h)|Xt = k, µ > t)−
∫ t+h
t
φp(zs)k
(ps)k
λ(zs)ds
)
−→
h→0+
0, (4.8)
and the convergence is locally uniform in t. The proof is omitted as it follows from standard
properties of jump processes.
We claim that:
∀t ≥ 0, pit∧µ = pt1t<µ + piµ1t≥µ. (4.9)
Indeed, for all t ∈ [0, T ), on {t < µ}, we have pit(k) = P(Xt = k|µ > t) so that we only have
to check that
P(Xt = k|µ > t) = pt(k).
Let c(t)k := P(Xt = k|µ > t), b(t) := P(µ > t) for t ∈ [0, T ). By conditioning on the events
{Xt = k, µ > t} for all k ∈ K, we have for all t in [0, T ):
1
h
(b(t+ h)− b(t)) −→
h→0+
b′(t) = −b(t)
∑
k
c(t)k
φp(zt)k
(pt)k
λ(zt). (4.10)
On the other hand, X is Markov with respect to the filtration t → FXt ∨ σ(u) and {µ > t}
belongs to the completion of FXt ∨σ(u) (see e.g. Proposition 1 in [42]), so that the conditional
law of (Xs)s≥t given {µ > t} is Pc(t). We deduce that
1
h
(P(Xt+h = k|µ > t)− P(Xt = k|µ > t)) −→
h→0+
(>Rc(t))k.
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We have:
1
h
(c(t+ h)k − c(t)k) = 1
h
[P(Xt+h = k|µ > t+ h)− P(Xt+h = k|µ > t)
+ P(Xt+h = k|µ > t)− P(Xt = k|µ > t)]
=
1
h
1
b(t)
(P(Xt+h = k, µ > t+ h)− P(Xt+h = k, µ > t))
+
1
h
P(Xt+h = k, µ > t+ h)(
1
b(t+ h)
− 1
b(t)
)
+
1
h
(P(Xt+h = k|µ > t)− P(Xt = k|µ > t)
Using that
P(Xt+h = k, µ > t+ h)− P(Xt+h = k, µ > t) = −P(Xt+h = k, µ ∈ (t, t+ h])
= −P(Xt = k, µ ∈ (t, t+ h]) + o(h),
we deduce that for all t ∈ [0, T ):
1
h
1
b(t)
(P(Xt+h = k, µ > t+ h)− P(Xt+h = k, µ > t)) −→
h→0+
−c(t)kφp(zt)k
(pt)k
λ(zt).
We conclude that for all t ∈ [0, T ):
1
h
(c(t+ h)k − c(t)k) −→
h→0+
c′(t)k = (>Rc(t))k − λ(zt)
[
φp(zt)k
c(t)k
(pt)k
− c(t)k
∑
k′
c(t)k′
(pt)k′
φp(zt)k′
]
.
Using condition (4.6), we can check that t→ pt is the unique solution of the above differential
equation, so that c(t) = p(t) for all t ∈ [0, T ) since c(0) = p(0). This concludes the proof of
(4.9). We deduce also that for all t ≥ 0, we have:
b(t) = P(µ > t) = exp(−
∫ t
0
λ(zs)ds).
Indeed, using that pt = c(t), the differential equation in the right-hand side of (4.10) admits
the above expression as unique solution.
We now prove that piµ = φp(zµ) on {µ <∞}. We start with the fact that
P(Xt = k|µ ∈ (t, t+ h]) = −b(t)(pt)kP(µ ∈ (t, t+ h]|Xt = k, µ > t)
b(t+ h)− b(t) .
For all t ∈ [0, T ), we have therefore:
P(Xt = k|µ ∈ (t, t+ h]) −→
h→0+
φp(zt)k, (4.11)
and the convergence is locally uniform in t.
For all n ≥ 1 and all i ∈ N, let tni = i2n . Let Hn denote the σ-field generated by the events
({µ ∈ (tni , tni+1]})i≥0. Then σ(µ) =
∨
n≥0Hn, and (up to null sets) Hµµ = σ(µ). For all k ∈ K,
we have by the martingale convergence theorem:
(piµ)k1µ<∞ = P(Xµ = k|Hµµ)1µ<∞ = limn→∞P(Xµ = k|H
n)1µ<∞ a.s.
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On the other hand, for all n ≥ 0, we have:
P(Xµ = k|Hn)1µ<∞ =
∑
i≥0 : tni <T
1µ∈(tni ,tni+1]P(Xµ = k|µ ∈ (tni , tni+1]).
The following convergence holds locally uniformly in t for t ∈ [0, T ):(
P(Xµ = k|µ ∈ (t, t+ 1
2n
])− P(Xt = k|µ ∈ (t, t+ 1
2n
])
)
−→
n→∞ 0.
We deduce easily that the following convergence holds almost surely:
P(Xµ = k|Hn)1µ<∞ → φp(zµ)k1µ<∞,
which concludes the proof that piµ = φp(zµ) on {µ <∞}.
To summarize, the process Z is such that for all t ≥ 0
Zt = zt1t<µ + φ(zµ)1t≥µ,
and µ is such that P(µ > t) = exp(− ∫ t0 λ(zs)ds). As, up to null sets, Hµ is the natural
filtration of Z, we deduce that Z is an Hµ-PDMP with characteristics (α, λ, φ), having a
unique jump at time µ.
• If z /∈ E, define the belief process pi by (4.1). Then pi0 = z′1µ>0 + z′′1µ=0 and P(µ > 0) =
1−m. Let us denote zt = (pt, yt) = wz′(t). Define then the process ξ by
∀t ≥ 0, ξt = yt1t<µ + φy(zµ)1t≥µ.
As for the previous case, the process Z with Zt := (pit∧µ, ξt) is an Hµ-PDMP with state space
E ⊂ ∆(K)×RL, characteristics (α, λ, φ), having a unique jump at time µ. Indeed, reasoning
conditionally on the event {µ > 0}, the same analysis as above shows that for all t ≥ 0
Zt1µ>0 = zt10<t<µ + φ(zµ)1t≥µ>0,
and that µ is such that P(µ > t|µ > 0) = exp(− ∫ t0 λ(zs)ds) for all t ≥ 0. On the other hand,
on the event {µ = 0}, we have Zt = Z0 = z′′ ∈ S for all t ≥ 0, which concludes the proof.
• Case z ∈ S. The process defined by Zt = z for all t ≥ 0, is an Hµ-PDMP with state space
E ⊂ ∆(K)× RL, characteristics (α, λ, φ).
Part 2: We prove the optimality of µ. Thanks to the results of part 1, we have constructed
an Hµ-PDMP Zt = (pit, ξt) with state space E ⊂ ∆(K)×RL and characteristics (α, λ, φ) such
that
(i) Z0 takes finitely many values and:
E[Z0] = (p, y), E[V∗(Z0)] = V∗(p, y).
(ii) Zt ∈ H on [0, µ), Z may jump only at time µ and Zµ ∈ S.
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As V∗ is convex and Lipschitz, and the vector field α is locally bounded, the map t→ V∗(wz˜(t))
is locally Lipschitz for all z˜ ∈ E, and therefore absolutely continuous with right-derivative
~DV∗(wz˜(t);α(wz˜(t)). It follows that V∗ belongs to the extended generator of the PDMP Z
(see Theorem 5.5 in Davis [10]) and Dynkin’s formula gives for any t ∈ R+
V∗(p, y) = E[V∗(Z0)]
= E[e−r(µ∧t)V∗(Zµ∧t) +
∫ µ∧t
0 re
−rsV∗(pis, ξs)ds
− ∫ µ∧t0 e−rs( ~DV∗(Zs;α(Zs)) + λ(Zs)(V∗(φ(z))− V∗(Zs)))ds] (4.12)
Using properties (SC4), we deduce that:
V∗(p, y) = E[e−r(µ∧t)V∗(Zµ∧t) +
∫ µ∧t
0
e−rs
(
rV∗(pis, ξs)− ~DV∗(Zs;α(Zs))
+ ~DV∗(Zs;λ(Zs)(φ(Zs)− Zs))
)
ds]
= E[e−r(µ∧t)V∗(Zµ∧t)
+
∫ µ∧t
0
e−rs
(
rV∗(Zs)− ~DV∗
(
Zs;α(Zs) + λ(Zs)(φ(Zs)− Zs)
))
ds]
= E[e−r(µ∧t)V∗(Zµ∧t) +
∫ µ∧t
0
e−rs
(
rV∗(Zs)− ~DV∗(Zs;AZs)
)
ds].
By construction, we have that rV∗(Zs)− ~DV∗(Zs;AZs) ≥ 0 on {s < µ}. This implies that for
all t:
V∗(p, y) ≥ EP′p,q
[
e−r(µ∧t)V∗(Zµ∧t)
]
= EP′p,q
[
1t<µe
−rtV∗(Zt) + 1µ≤te−rµV∗(Zµ)
]
≥ EP′p,q
[
e−rtf∗(Zt)1t<µ + e−rµh∗(Zµ)1µ≤t
]
= EP′p,q
[
e−rtf∗(Xt, ξt)1t<µ + e−rµh∗(Xµ, ξµ)1µ≤t
]
,
where the last equality follows by conditioning with respect to Hµt and Hµµ. Finally, we obtain
V∗(p, y) ≥ supt∈R+ EP′p,q
[
e−rtf∗(Xt, ξt)1t<µ + e−rµh∗(Xµ, ξµ)1µ≤t
]
= supτ∈T Y EP′p,q [e
−rτf∗(Xτ , ξτ )1τ<µ + e−rµh∗(Xµ, ξµ)1µ≤τ ] ,
(4.13)
where the last equality follows from the fact that the expression inside the expectation is
independent of FY∞ (and using the same method as for Remark 3.4).
To conclude the proof, we use duality exactly as in Proposition 3.10.
Recall that since y ∈ ∂−2 V (p, q), we have
V (p, q) = 〈q, y〉 − V∗(p, y).
It follows that
V (p, q) ≤ inf
τ∈T Y
〈q, y〉 − EP′p,q
[
e−rτf∗(Xτ , ξτ )1τ<µ + e−rµh∗(Xµ, ξµ)1µ≤τ
]
.
For any τ ∈ T Y , we have, using that Y and ξ are independent
〈q, y〉 = Ep,q[e−rτ 〈δYτ , ξτ 〉1τ<µ + e−rµ〈δYµ , ξµ〉1µ≤τ ].
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We deduce that
〈q, y〉 − EP′p,q
[
e−rτf∗(Xτ , ξτ )1τ<µ + e−rµh∗(Xµ, ξµ)1µ≤τ
]
= EP′p,q [e
−rτ (〈δYτ , ξτ 〉 − f∗(Xτ , ξτ ))1τ<µ + e−rµ(〈δYµ , ξµ〉 − h∗(Xµ, ξµ))1µ≤τ ]. (4.14)
It follows from the definitions of f∗, h∗ that:
〈δYτ , ξτ 〉 − f∗(Xτ , ξτ ) ≤ f(Xτ , Yτ )
〈δYµ , ξµ〉 − h∗(Xµ, ξµ) ≤ h(Xµ, Yµ),
from which we conclude that
〈q, y〉 − EP′p,q
[
e−rτf∗(Xτ , ξτ )1τ<µ + e−rµh∗(Xµ, ξµ)1µ≤τ
]
≤ EP′p,q [e−rτf(Xτ , Yτ )1τ<µ + e−rµh(Xµ, Yµ)1µ≤τ ]. (4.15)
Substituting in the previous inequality, we have
V (p, q) ≤ inf
τ∈T Y
EP′p,q [e
−rτf(Xτ , Yτ )1τ<µ + e−rµh(Xµ, Yµ)1µ≤τ ] = inf
τ∈T Y
EPp,q [J¯(µ, τ)],
which proves the optimality of µ.
5 Two examples
As explained in section 6, we conjecture that Theorem 4.2 can be applied to any instance of
the model studied in this paper. However, the proof of such a conjecture seems very difficult
and related to a stratification problem which is beyond the scope of this paper. For this
reason, in order to illustrate how to apply our verification result, we only consider two simple
examples for which we can provide explicit solutions. In both cases, we can compute the value
function, and this makes possible to verify the assumptions of Theorem 4.2. These examples
are reminiscent of several explicit computations for the asymptotic value of repeated games
with incomplete information on both sides by Mertens and Zamir in [34]. As in [34], we do
not know exactly for which class of games such an explicit computation is possible, and we
only claim that the same method can be applied to some variants of the first example, or for
any one-dimensional model as the second example studied below.
5.1 Asymmetric Information with constant states
We assume that K = L = {0, 1} and that R = Q = 0, which means that Xt = X0 and Yt = Y0
almost surely for all t ≥ 0.
With an abuse of notation, we write V (p, q) for V ((p, 1− p), (q, 1− q)) for (p, q) ∈ [0, 1]2 (and
similarly for f, h). V as well as f and h are thus seen as a functions defined on [0, 1]2.
Let us consider the particular case
h(p, q) = 3p+ 2q − 4, f(p, q) = 2p+ 3q − 1.
More general cases can be solved with similar arguments.
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5.1.1 The value function
Note at first that the fact that R = Q = 0 implies that the directional derivatives appearing
in the variational characterization of the value function given in Theorem 3.3 are all equal to
zero. Moreover, using that r > 0, the variational inequalities do not depend on the discount
factor. Precisely, applying Theorem 3.3, we have that the value function V is the unique
Lipschitz saddle function such that f ≥ V ≥ h and
∀q ∈ [0, 1],∀p ∈ Ext(V (., q)), V (p, q) > h(p, q)⇒ V (p, q) ≤ 0, (5.1)
∀p ∈ [0, 1], ∀q ∈ Ext(V (p, .)), V (p, q) < f(p, q)⇒ V (p, q) ≥ 0. (5.2)
The explicit expression for V is given in the next proposition.
Proposition 5.1.
V (p, q) =

0 if (p, q) ∈ [12 , 1]× [0, 12 ]
2q−1
q (p+ q − 1) if p ≥ 1− q, and q ≥ 12
1−2p
1−p (p+ q − 1) if q ≤ 1− p, and p ≤ 12 .
One may prove the above proposition by verification, by checking that V fulfills all the
conditions given in Theorem 3.3. Nevertheless, let us explain briefly how to obtain directly
this explicit expression. (5.1) implies that for any given q ∈ [0, 1], the map p → V (p, q)
is affine on any interval on which it is non-negative, and (5.2) implies a dual property for
q → V (p, q). Using these properties, it is easy to check that
V (p, 0) =
{
f(p, 0) if p ≤ 12
0 if p ≥ 12
, V (p, 1) = ph(1, 1),
V (1, q) =
{
0 if q ≤ 12
h(1, q) if q ≥ 12
, V (0, q) = (1− q)f(0, 0).
Using that V is a saddle function, we deduce also that
∀(p, q) ∈ [12 , 1]× [0, 12] , V (p, q) = 0.
Using continuity and concavity with respect to the first variable, there exists necessarily a one-
to-one map p ∈ [0, 1/2]→ m(p) such that V (p,m(p)) = 0 (it may be any closed set using only
continuity of V , but concavity implies that it is indeed a curve). Using the above-mentioned
properties, the following functions are affine
∀q ∈ [1/2, 1], p ∈ [m−1(q), 1]→ V (p, q),
∀p ∈ [0, 1/2], q ∈ [0,m(p)]→ V (p, q).
Writing the condition that V is a saddle function at points (p,m(p)), it leads to m(p) = 1−p.
Remark 5.2. If one slightly perturbs the coefficients of the functions f, h, the above method
still applies. However, the expression of the map m will be more complex.
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5.1.2 Non-existence of the value with non-randomized stopping times
Let us take benefit here from having at hand an explicit solution for the value V to show
that in general the value of the same game where both players are restricted to pure (i.e.
non-randomized) stopping times does not exist. We choose this example for convenience as
the proof is very short. However, let us emphasize that one may construct a simpler game2
with incomplete information on one side only and with a constant Markov chain (i.e. with
L = {∅} and R = 0) for which this value does not exist. Note that the value neither exists
in the second example studied below, but the proof of this result is much longer and more
technical than for the present example.
Let us define Vˆ +, Vˆ − as the lower and upper value of the same game where both players
are restricted to pure (classical) stopping times, i.e. for all (p, q) ∈ [0, 1]2 (using the same
convention as above)
Vˆ +(p, q) := inf
ν∈T Y
sup
µ∈T X
Ep,q
[
J¯(µ, ν)
]
, (5.3)
Vˆ −(p, q) := sup
µ∈T X
inf
ν∈T Y
Ep,q
[
J¯(µ, ν)
]
. (5.4)
Then a direct computation shows that:
Vˆ −(p, q) = sup
t0,t1∈R+
inf
s0,s1∈R+
∑
i,j=0,1
piqje
−r(ti∧sj) (h(i, j)1ti<sj + f(i, j)1sj≤tj)
=

pq − (1− q) if pq > (1− q)
0 if p ≥ 1/2 and pq ≤ 1− q
(1− 2p)(pq − (1− q)) if p < 1/2 and pq ≤ 1− q
where p0 = p and p1 = 1− p, and similarly for q0, q1. On the other hand, by symmetry of the
problem, one shows that:
Vˆ +(p, q) = −Vˆ −(1− q, 1− p).
The reader may check that p→ Vˆ −(p, 2/3) is not concave, that q → Vˆ +(1/3, q) is not convex
and that
∀p ∈ (0, 1/2), Vˆ +(p, 1− p) > V (p, 1− p) > Vˆ −(p, 1− p)
which proves that the value does not exist in general when players are restricted to pure
stopping times.
5.1.3 Optimal strategies
We will show how to construct for our example an optimal stopping time µ ∈ T Xm for player
1. Optimal stopping times for player 2 can be determined in a similar way.
For (p, y) ∈ [0, 1]× R, we consider the (restricted) convex conjugate
V∗(p, y) := V∗((p, 1− p), (y, 0)) = max
q∈[0,1]
qy − V (p, q).
2For example, if K = {0, 1}, R = 0, L = {∅}, f(0) = 2, f(1) = −1, h(0) = 1, h(1) = −2, one can check
easily that the value of the game with pure stopping times does not exists when p = ( 1
2
, 1
2
), and that the lower
value of this game is not concave.
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As V∗((p, 1−p), (y1, y2)) = y2 +V∗((p, 1−p), (y1−y2, 0)), Theorem 4.2 can be applied without
any modification to the functions V and V∗ as redefined here. Note that the set H is given by
H := {(p, y) ∈ [0, 1]× R | rV∗(p, y)− ~D2V∗(p, y; ry) ≥ 0}.
In order to calculate V∗ we distinguish different zones of [0, 1]× R.
We set
A = {(p, y) : p ≥ 1/2 , y ≤ 0}
B = {(p, y) : p ≥ 1/2 , y ∈ [0, 4p− 2]}
C = {(p, y) : p ≤ 1/2 , y ≤ 1−2p1−p }
D = {(p, y) : p ≥ 1/2 , y ∈ [4p− 2, 1 + p]}
∪ {(p, y) : p ≤ 1/2 , y ∈ [1−2p1−p , 1 + p]}
E = {(p, y) : y ≥ 1 + p}.
A direct computation yields
V∗(p, y) =

0 for (p, y) ∈ A
1
2y for (p, y) ∈ B
1− 2p for (p, y) ∈ C
−2√2− y√1− p+ 3− 2p for (p, y) ∈ D
y − p for (p, y) ∈ E,
y
p10
0
1
2
1/2
A
B
C
D
E
and that
h∗(p, y) =
{
4− 3p if y ≤ 2
y + 2− 3p if y ≥ 2.
.
It follows that S = {(p, y) |V∗(p, y) = h∗(p, y)} = {(1, y) | y ≥ 2}. One can easily check that
H = A ∪B ∪ C ∪ {p = 0}.
Furthermore we note that V∗ is affine on each zone A,B,C,E.
On D, V∗ is not an affine function, however it is easily seen that for each p ∈ [0, 1/2], V∗ is
affine on the segment joining the point (p, 1−2p1−p ) and the point (1, 2). In order to construct
an optimal stopping time we shall first construct some characteristics (α, λ, φ) satisfying the
conditions (SC) of Definition 4.1.
The actual state space of our PDMP Z will be E = EH ∪ S with EH = A ∪ C ∪ {p = 0}.
Roughly speaking, when starting in EH, this process has to stay in EH and may jump one
time over a flat part of the graph of V∗ from EH to ES = S. The condition (4.6) implies that
for all z = (p, y) ∈ EH:
λ(z)(φ(z)− z) + α(z) = (0, ry). (5.5)
As EH has to be invariant for the flow associated to the vector field α, if for some point z,
the solution of the differential equation associated to the vector field (0, ry) starting at z does
not exit EH immediately, we simply choose α(z) = (0, ry) and λ(z) = 0.
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We are left to consider the points z = (p, 1−2p1−p ) for p ∈ (0, 1/2). For these points, the process
has to jump with positive intensity, otherwise it will exit from EH. In order for the jump
to be on a flat part of the graph of V∗, the only possible ending point in S is (1, 2). We
define therefore φ(z) = (1, 2). The condition (4.5) requires V∗ to be differentiable at z in the
direction of the cone generated by {α(z), λ(z)((1, 2) − z)}. Together with the fact that the
solution of w′ = α(w) starting at z has to stay in EH, this implies that α(z) is tangent to the
boundary of EH, i.e. α(z) = κ(z)(1, −1(1−p)2 ) for some constant κ(z).
Equation 5.5 becomes:
λ(z)((1, 2)− z) + κ(z)(1, −1
(1− p)2 ) = (0, ry),
which leads to the unique solution
λ(z) =
r(1− 2p)
2
, α(z) =
r(1− 2p)
2
(
−(1− p), 1
1− p
)
=
(
−r
2
(1− 2p)(1− p), r
2
y
)
.
Below, we describe the optimal stopping time µ for all the possible pairs (p, y) given by
Theorem 4.2.
Let (p, y) ∈ ∆(K)× R.
• If (p, y) ∈ {y ≤ 0} ∪ {p = 0}, then µ = +∞ is optimal.
• If (p, y) ∈ S, then µ = 0 is optimal.
• If (p, y) ∈ E ∩ {0 < p < 1}, then an optimal µ is given by:
µ = 0.1X0=0 + (+∞).1X0=1.
The induced belief process is pit = 1.1X0=0 + 0.1X0=1 for t ≥ 0, and ξ is defined by:
∀t ≥ 0, ξt = ertξ0, with ξ0 = 2.1X0=0 +
y − 2p
1− p 1X0=1.
• If p ∈ (0, 12) and y ∈ (0, 1−2p1−p ], let zt = (pt, yt) denote the unique solution of dztdt = α(zt)
with initial condition z0 = (p, y). Then the optimal µ is given by
µ(ω, u) = (+∞)1X0=1 + S(u)1X0=0,
where S is the unique non-decreasing function from (0, 1) to R such that
∀t ≥ 0,
∫ 1
0
1S(u)>tdu = exp
(
−
∫ t
0
ρ(zs)ds
)
,
with ρ(zs) =
1
ps
λ(ps, ys). The induced belief process is given by:
∀t ≥ 0, pit = pt1t<µ + 1.1t≥µ,
and ξ is defined by:
∀t ≥ 0, ξt = yt1t<µ + 2er(t−µ)1t≥µ.
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Player 1 simply stops with some intensity ρ(zt) = ρ(Zt) conditionally on the fact that X0 = 0.
The induced intensity of jump of Z is therefore equal to pitρ(Zt) = λ(Zt) as required.
• If (p, y) ∈ B, then an optimal µ is defined by
µ(ω, u) = 0.1{X0=0, u≤ y2p} + (+∞).1{X0=1}∪{X0=0,u> y2p}.
It means that player 1 stops with probability y2p at time 0 conditionally on X0 = 0, and never
stops otherwise. The induced belief process is pit =
2p−y
2−y 1µ≤t + 1.1µ>t for t ≥ 0 and ξ is
defined by ξt = 0.1µ≤t + 2ert1µ>t for t ≥ 0.
• If (p, y) ∈ D, let p′ ∈ [0, 1/2] be such that (p, y) belongs to the segment joining (p′, 1−2p′1−p′ )
and (1, 2). An easy computation shows that
p′ = 1−
√
1− p
2− y .
Define zt = (pt, yt) as the unique solution of
dzt
dt = α(zt) with initial condition z0 = (p
′, 1−2p
′
1−p′ ).
Then an optimal µ is defined by
µ(ω, u) = 0.1{X0=0, u≤x} + S
(
u− x
1− x
)
1{X0=0, u>x} + (+∞).1{X0=1}.
where x = p−p
′
p(1−p′) and S is the unique non-decreasing function from (0, 1) to R such that
∀t ≥ 0,
∫ 1
0
1S(u)>tdu = exp
(
−
∫ t
0
ρ(zs)ds
)
.
with ρs =
1
ps
λ(ps, ys). The induced belief process is given by:
∀t ≥ 0, pit = pt1t<µ + 1.1t≥µ,
and ξ is defined by:
∀t ≥ 0, ξt = yt1t<µ + 2er(t−µ)1t≥µ.
Player 1 stops at time 0 conditionally on X0 = 0 with probability x, and x was constructed
so that pi0 = p
′1µ>0 + 1.1µ=0. If he did not stop at time 0, player 1 stops with intensity
ρ(zt) = ρ(Zt) conditionally on X0 = 0. As above, the induced intensity of jump for Zt is
pitρ(Zt) = λ(Zt).
5.2 Case of incomplete information on one side
Next, we consider the particular case where the set L is reduced to a single point, implying
that player 2 has no private information. In this context, admissible stopping times of player
2 are simply random times (see Definition 2.1) and the value function V depends only on
p ∈ ∆(K).
Furthermore we assume that there are only two states for the Markov chain X which is
observed by player 1, i.e. K := {0, 1}. We choose X to be an ergodic chain with generator
R :=
(−a a
b −b
)
, where a, b > 0 so that the unique invariant measure is ( ba+b ,
a
a+b).
With a slight abuse of notation, we write V (p) for V (p, 1−p) p ∈ [0, 1] (and similarly for f, h).
V as well as f and h are thus seen as a functions defined on [0, 1]. Rather than providing a
complete study of this one-dimensional case, we work under the following assumptions:
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(H1) For all p ∈ [0, 1], 0 < h(p) < f(p).
(H2) f and h are increasing on [0, 1], i.e. h(0) < h(1) and f(0) < f(1).
We impose (H1) and (H2) merely to simplify the presentation. Other cases can be studied
with similar arguments.
5.2.1 Value function
By Theorem 3.3, V is the unique concave Lipschitz function on [0, 1] such that f ≥ V ≥ h
and
∀p ∈ [0, p∗], V (p) < f(p) ⇒ rV (p) + ((a+ b)p− b)V ′+(p) ≥ 0
∀p ∈ (p∗, 1], V (p) < f(p) ⇒ rV (p)− ((a+ b)p− b)V ′−(p) ≥ 0,
and for any extreme point p ∈ Ext(V ) :
p ∈ [0, p∗] and V (p) > h(p) ⇒ rV (p) + ((a+ b)p− b)V ′+(p) ≤ 0
p ∈ (p∗, 1] and V (p) > h(p) ⇒ rV (p)− ((a+ b)p− b)V ′−(p) ≤ 0,
(5.6)
where V ′+, V ′− denote the left and right derivative of V and p∗ =
b
a+b .
The following result can be shown by explicitly solving (5.6).
Proposition 5.3. Under assumptions (H1) and (H2) we distinguish three cases:
(i) if bb+rh(1) > f(0) the value function is given by
V (p) =
{
f(p) on [0, p0]
p−p0
1−p0h(1) +
1−p
1−p0 f(p0) on (p0, 1],
(5.7)
where p0 is the unique solution in (0, p
∗) of the quadratic equation:
h(1)− f(p0)
1− p0 =
−rf(p0)
(a+ b)p0 − b . (5.8)
(ii) if h(0) < bb+rh(1) ≤ f(0), we have
V (p) =
b
b+ r
h(1)(1− p) + ph(1).
(iii) if bb+rh(1) ≤ h(0) we have V = h on [0, 1].
The proof of Proposition 5.3 follows by verification by checking that (5.6) holds. One may
also easily obtain the solution by a direct approach. Indeed, note that all positive solutions
to
rw(p) + (b− (a+ b)p)w′(p) = 0 (5.9)
are strictly convex, so that using (H1) and (5.6), we may prove that V (p) necessarily is a
concave and piecewise affine function, having no extreme point in {h < V < f}∩ (0, 1). Using
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a+b 1
p
h
f
Figure 5.1: Value function in case (i)
then (H2) and (5.6) applied in p = 1 (which is always an extreme point), we deduce that
V (1) = h(1), and (5.6) applied in p = 0 allows to compute V (0). The problem is solved in
cases (ii) and (iii). For case (i), we have V (0) = f(0), and (5.6) gives a condition for the
left or right derivative of V in the only interior extreme point p0, which is (5.8). Figure 5.1
illustrates the shape of the function V (in red) in case (i). p0 is the unique point in (0, p
∗)
such that the solution of (5.9) passing through (p0, f(p0)) (the blue dotted line) is tangent to
the line joining (p0, f(p0)) and (1, h(1)).
Let us give an intuition for the above result. Recall that p is the probability that the
chain starts in state 0. Therefore, h(1) is the payoff of player 1 if he stops when the chain is
in state 0. The quantity bb+rh(1) is the expected payoff of player 1 when the chain starts in
state 1 if he stops at the first time the chain jumps in state 0 while player 2 does not stop.
Therefore if bb+rh(1) ≤ h(0) (case (iii)), there is no gain to wait for the chain to jump in state
0 for player 1. It results that at equilibrium, player 1 will stop immediately, independently
of the position of the chain while player 2 will never stop. If we have h(0) < bb+rh(1), then
there is a gain for player 1 to wait for the chain to jump in state 0, and he will stop only
when the chain is in state 0. In case bb+rh(1) ≤ f(0) (case (ii)), this gain is not sufficient
for player 2 to stop, and at equilibrium player 1 will stop at the first time the chain reaches
the state 0 while player 2 will never stop. If bb+rh(1) > f(0) (case (i)), the situation is more
interesting. If player 2 knows that the chain is in state 1, he will stop immediately to obtain
the payoff f(0). If player 1 stops at the first time the chain reaches the state 0, this strategy
is completely revealing in the sense that player 2 learns immediately that the chain is in
state 1 by observing that player 1 did not stop at time 0, and will stop at time 0+ in this
case. This strategy guarantees to player 1 the payoff (1− p)f(0) + ph(1) which is strictly less
than the above formula given for the value. Player 1 has therefore to take care of the beliefs
induced by his strategy. His optimal strategy is formally given in the next section and can
be described as follows: if the belief of player 2 is below p0, he waits until his belief reaches
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the value p0. If the belief is above p0, he stops with positive probability conditionally on the
fact that X0 = 0, and this probability is such that the belief of player 2 given that player 1
did not stop is equal to p0. If the belief of player 2 is equal to p0, then player 1 stops with a
positive intensity λ1 conditionally on the fact that X0 = 0, and λ1 is such that the belief of
player 2 given that player 1 did not stop remains constant over time equal to p0. Knowing
the value function and the strategy we just described, it is not difficult to check directly that
this strategy is optimal. In the next subsection, we show how to find directly this optimal
strategy by applying Theorem 4.2.
Remark 5.4. In case (i), the solution S(p) of the game where none of the players observe
the Markov chain X is easily obtained by solving the obstacle problem (3.4). Precisely, we
obtain that S = f on [0, p1), S = h on [p2, 1] and that S solves the ODE
rS(p) + ((a+ b)p− b)S′(p) = 0
on the interval [p1, p2] where p1 < p0 < p2 < p
∗. The points p1, p2 are obtained using that S has
to be differentiable at p2 (the “smooth fit” condition). Note that despite the characterizations
for S and V rely on the same variational inequalities, the convexity constraints for V and the
fact that the variational inequalities apply only at extreme points imply that the shape of V
significantly differs from that of S.
The solution in case (ii) implies that it is optimal for player 1 to wait for the more favor-
able state 0 before he stops, while the solution in case (iii) implies that it is optimal for player
1 to stop immediately. The optimal strategy for the more interesting case (i) is detailed in
the next section.
5.2.2 Optimal Strategy for the informed player
We construct an optimal strategy for the player 1 in case that (H1) and (H2) and the condition
(i) of Proposition 5.3 are valid. To construct optimal stopping times we will use Theorem 4.2.
As the parameter q ∈ ∆(L) plays no role here (L is a singleton), we let the reader verify that
Theorem 4.2 applies directly to the function −V in place of V ∗ since formally ∆(L) = {1}
and for y ∈ R
V ∗(p, y) = y − V (p).
As a result, the component ξ of the PDMP Z plays absolutely no role, and can be replaced
by 0. In the following, we suppress the component ξ and we will construct a PDMP pi having
the required properties.
The reader can easily verify that the set H is given by H = [0, p0], where p0 is given by (5.8)
and that S = {1}.
Let us construct the characteristics (α, λ, φ) of the PDMP pi meeting the structure conditions
(SC) of Definition 4.1. The state space of pi will be E = EH ∪ S with EH = H. At first the
structure condition (4.6) becomes
∀p ∈ [0, p0], λ(p)(φ(p)− p) + α(p) = −ap+ b(1− p).
We define α(p) = −ap + b(1 − p) and λ(p) = 0 for p ∈ [0, p0). For the point p0, we need to
have a positive intensity of jump since the solution of w′(t) = −aw(t) + b(1 − w(t)) starting
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at p0 exits H immediately. Thanks to (SC3), the jump has to end in S so that we define
φ(p0) = 1. The above condition becomes
α(p0) = −ap0 + b(1− p0)− λ(p0)(1− p0).
The condition (4.5) requires V to be differentiable in the cone generated by α(p0) and λ(p0)(1−
p0) > 0. As V is not differentiable at p0, this implies α(p0) ≥ 0 so that the condition becomes
equivalent to the existence of a right-derivative. On the other hand, the fact that H has to
be invariant by the flow of the ODE w′ = α(w) implies α(p0) ≤ 0. The only possible choice
is thus α(p0) = 0 and λ(p0) =
b−(a+b)p0
1−p0 .
The next proposition describes optimal stopping times for all initial p ∈ [0, 1] obtained by
applying Theorem 4.2.
Proposition 5.5. Assume that (H1) and (H2) and the condition (i) of Proposition 5.3 are
valid. An optimal strategy µ : Ω × [0, 1] → [0,+∞) for player 1 is given by the following
expressions.
(i) For p = p0:
µ(ω, u) := inf
{
t ≥ 0|
∫ t
0
1Xs=0ds ≥
− ln(1− u)
λ1
}
, with λ1 :=
b− (a+ b)p0
p0(1− p0) > 0.
That means player 1 stops with intensity λ1 conditionally on Xt = 0.
(ii) For p > p0:
µ(ω, u) :=
{
0 if X0 = 0 and u ∈ [0, c(p))
inf
{
t ≥ 0| ∫ t0 1Xs=0ds ≥ − ln(1−u˜)λ1 } otherwise,
where c(p) := p−p0p(1−p0) and u˜ :=
u−c(p)
1−c(p)1X0=0 + u1X0=1.
That means that at time t = 0, player 1 stops with probability p−p0p(1−p0) if X0 = 0, and if
he did not stop at t = 0, he stops with intensity λ1 conditionally on the fact that Xt = 0.
(iii) For p < p0:
µ(ω, u) := inf
{
t ≥ t(p)|
∫ t
t(p)
1Xs=0ds ≥
− ln(1− u)
λ1
}
,
where t(p) := inf{t ≥ 0|Pp(Xt = 0) = p0}.
That means that player 1 waits until the probability that player 2 assigns to the event
Xt = 0 reaches p0 and then stops with intensity λ1 conditionally on the fact that Xt = 0.
Note that the same method can be applied to compute explicitly optimal strategies for
player 2 in this example. These solutions being quite similar to the previously studied cases,
they are not presented here.
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6 Open questions
The first natural question is to which class of games our verification result (Theorem 4.2)
applies. We actually conjecture that it may be applied to any instance of our model, but
all the examples in which we were able to use it share the property that V and V∗ admits
a smooth stratification. Once we know that such a stratification exists, we think that the
method used in section 5 to construct the characteristics (α, λ, φ) satisfying the required
assumptions should work. However, we do not know how to handle the problem of existence
of a smooth stratification for the value function, and such stratification problems are known
to be very difficult in geometry.
A possible extension is to investigate the case where the Markov processes X and Y have
infinite state space, e.g. diffusion processes. The main difficulty is that our approach leads
formally to study partial differential equations in infinite dimensional spaces of probabilities.
The only results in this direction consider differential games where the information parameters
of the game do not evolve over time (see Cardaliaguet and Rainer [8]) and more recently a
game where only one player observes a Brownian motion (see Gensbittel and Rainer [24]).
Another interesting question is whether our methods can be adapted to consider Markov
chains (X,Y ) which are correlated. Indeed, in our proof of the Dynamic Programming prin-
ciple the independence plays an important role, since it allows to detach the two dynamics in
(3.16). The case of correlated information in the information asymmetry is static has been
studied in [37]. Its generalization to an evolving setting is far from being obvious and an
interesting subject for further studies.
In view of possible applications to stopping games arising e.g. in financial mathematics,
one may also consider models with publicly observed diffusive dynamics. The particular case
where the information parameters were not evolving was considered in [26], and the case with
symmetric incomplete information on the drift parameter of a diffusion was analyzed by De
Angelis, Gensbittel and Villeneuve [11]. A generalization of these results is an interesting
point for further research.
We only consider the values of discounted games, and a natural question is whether there
exists a limit value when the discount factor r vanishes. In the particular case where the
Markov chains are constant (i.e. R = 0 and Q = 0), one sees that the value function is
independent of r, and thus the limit value exists and is characterized by the same variational
inequalities (note however that the optimal strategies depend on r, see the first example in
section 5). In the second example of section 5, it is easily seen from Proposition 5.3 that a
limit value exists, but we do not know if this phenomenon is general and if we can obtain a
characterization of the limit value whenever it exists. Such a characterization was provided
in Gensbittel and Renault [25] for the limit value of Markov chain games with incomplete
information on both sides, and it relies on the distinction between hard information which
tells something about the recurrence class to which the chain belongs, and soft information
which may only inform about the relative position of the chain within the different recurrence
classes. In a repeated game, soft information is renewable in the sense that if player 1 reveals
soft information, he can wait until the marginal distribution of the chain is close to an invariant
measure within each recurrence class. Such a distinction may be useful to analyze the existence
and characterization of the limit value in our model when there are several recurrence classes,
and this is an interesting point for further research.
In several models of timing games, such as strategic experimentation models (see e.g.
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Rosenberg, Solan and Vieille [39] and the references therein) the players receive a flow of
payoffs instead of a terminal payoff. Even if the natural framework of these problems is a non
zero-sum game, one may consider by analogy a zero-sum model with integral payoffs given by
J1(µ, ν)(ω, u, v) :=
∫ ν
0
e−rsf(Xs, Ys)ds1ν<µ +
∫ µ
0
e−rsh(Xs, Ys)ds1µ≤ν .
The extension of our results to this model is left for future research.
At last, the extension of our result to non zero-sum models is a challenging and very in-
teresting problem, which may allow to handle strategic experimentation models or real option
problems with incomplete information. Although the study of Nash equilibria in non zero-sum
games generally differs drastically from the study of optimal strategies in zero-sum games, it
appears that in different models of non zero-sum stopping games, equilibrium strategies have
some similarities with the optimal strategies of zero-sum stopping games. For example, in the
recent work of De Angelis, Ferrari and Moriarty [12], war of attrition type of non zero-sum
games are considered, and the variational characterization of these equilibria using thresh-
old strategies is very close to that of the corresponding zero-sum model. Ekstrom, Glover
and Leniec [16] consider a zero-sum stopping game with heterogeneous prior beliefs (which is
equivalent to a non zero-sum stopping game) and provide an example of equilibrium in mixed
stopping times, where a player stops with some varying intensity, exactly as in our Theorem
4.2. These similarities suggest to study the problem of existence of equilibria in mixed strate-
gies in non zero-sum stopping games with incomplete information using variational methods
and strategies having the same structure as the optimal strategies described in Theorem 4.2.
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A Technical proofs and auxiliary tools
A.1 Auxiliary results of convex analysis
We prove here some elementary results in convex analysis that we are using in the proof
of Proposition 3.9. The following lemmas are easy adaptations of classical and well-known
results to Lipschitz convex functions with polyhedral domains. As references covering exactly
what we need were difficult to find, we decided to add this appendix for the convenience of
the reader. Note that we do not try to provide the most general version of these lemmas.
Lemma A.1. Let f be a Lipschitz convex function from C to R. Assume that C is a polyhe-
dron, then if TC(x) denotes the tangent cone of C at x:
∀x ∈ C,∀v ∈ TC(x), ~Df(x; v) = max
u∈∂−f(x)
〈u, v〉.
Proof. This relation holds for any point x in the relative interior of C (see Theorem 23.4 in
[41]). For x in the relative boundary of C, the left hand-side of the above equality is always
greater than the right-hand side using the definition of subgradients.
For m ∈ N∗ with m ≥M , where M is the Lipschitz constant of f , define the Moreau-Yosida
regularization
∀x ∈ Rn, fm(x) := inf
y∈C
f(y) +m|y − x|.
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The function fm is convex, m-Lipschitz (so that subgradients of fm are uniformly bounded
by m) and coincides with f on C. As fm ≤ f , we have for all x ∈ C, ∂−fm(x) ⊂ ∂−f(x).
For any v ∈ TC(x), we have that x + tv ∈ C for all sufficiently small t > 0 (here we use the
polyhedron assumption) and therefore:
~Df(x; v) = ~Dfm(x; v) = max
u∈∂−fm(x)
〈u, v〉 ≤ sup
u∈∂−f(x)
〈u, v〉.
Lemma A.2 (Danskin). Let P be a non-empty compact subset of Rm and C a non-empty
polyhedron in Rn. Let f be a real-valued Lipschitz function defined on P × C. Assume that
for all p ∈ P , the function fp defined on Rn by fp(x) = f(p, x) is a convex function. Define
g(x) = supp∈P f(p, x). Then, if for x¯ ∈ C, the maximum maxp∈P f(p, x¯) is uniquely attained
in p¯, we have
∂−g(x¯) = ∂−fp¯(x¯).
Proof. Note that both sets are non-empty due to the Lipschitz assumption, and that the
inclusion ∂−fp¯(x¯) ⊂ ∂−g(x¯) is a direct consequence of the definitions. Let us prove the
reverse inclusion. Assume by contradiction the there exists v ∈ ∂−g(x¯) \ ∂−fp¯(x¯). Then,
using a separation argument, there exists z ∈ Rn and ε > 0 such that:
∀u ∈ ∂−fp¯(x¯), 〈z, v〉 ≥ ε+ 〈z, u〉. (A.1)
For all u ∈ ∂−fp¯(x¯), w in the normal cone of C at x¯ and j ∈ N∗, we have u+ jw ∈ ∂−fp¯(x¯).
Replacing u bu u + jw in (A.1), and taking the limit as j → ∞, we deduce that 〈z, w〉 ≤ 0,
implying that z belongs to the tangent cone of C at x¯. Since C is a polyhedron, x¯ + tz ∈ C
for all t ∈ (0, α) for some α > 0. Up to replace z by αz, we may assume that x¯+ z ∈ C. Let
pn be a sequence maximizing f(p, x¯+
z
n). The sequence pn converges to p¯ using the continuity
of f and g. For s ∈ (0, 1) and n such that 1n ≤ s we have
f(pn, x¯+ sz)− f(pn, x¯)
s
≥ f(pn, x¯+
z
n)− f(pn, x¯)
n−1
≥ g(x¯+
z
n)− g(x¯)
n−1
≥ 〈z, v〉.
Letting n go to +∞, we deduce that for all s ∈ (0, 1),
f(p¯, x¯+ sz)− f(p¯, x¯)
s
≥ 〈z, v〉.
Taking the limit when s→ 0+ and using the preceding lemma, we conclude that
Dfp¯(x¯, z) = sup
u∈∂−fp¯(x¯)
〈z, u〉 ≥ 〈z, v〉,
which is a contradiction.
Before stating the next lemma, let us recall the definition of an exposed point.
Definition A.3. Let f : Rm → R∪ {+∞} be a convex function. The set of exposed points of
f is defined is defined as the set of all x ∈ Rn such that there exists x∗ ∈ ∂−f(x) such that
∀x′ 6= x, f(x′) > f(x) + 〈x∗, x′ − x〉.
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Lemma A.4. Let C ⊂ Rm be a compact polyhedron and f : C → R a convex Lipschitz
function. If x is an extreme point of f and z in the tangent cone of C at x, then there exists
a sequence xn of exposed points of f with limit x such that
~Df(xn; z)→ ~Df(x; z).
Proof. Let us choose y ∈ ∂−f(x) such that ~Df(x; z) = 〈z, y〉. We claim that x is an extreme
point of ∂−f∗(y). Note at first that Fenchel’s Lemma implies that x ∈ ∂−f∗(y). Assume then
that x is not an extreme point of ∂−f∗(y), so that there exists a segment (x1, x2) containing
x and included in ∂−f∗(y). It follows that y ∈ ∂−f(x′) for all x′ ∈ (x1, x2), and thus that f
restricted to this segment is affine, which contradicts the fact that x is an extreme point of f .
Using Theorem 25.6 of [41], there exists therefore a sequence yn with limit y such that f
∗ is
differentiable at yn and the sequence xn := ∇f∗(yn) has limit x. (In the proof of Theorem
25.6 of [41], this statement is proved only for exposed points of ∂−f∗(y), but this extends
easily to extreme points by a diagonal extraction). The sequence of points xn is made of
exposed points of f by Corollary 25.1.2 in [41] and
lim inf
n
~Df(xn; z) ≥ lim
n
〈yn, z〉 = 〈y, z〉 = ~Df(x; z).
The reverse inequality follows from Lemma A.1 together with the fact the correspondence of
superdifferentials has closed graph.
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